| The United States told the Iraqi government last week that if it wants U.S. troops to remain in Iraq beyond the deadline of Dec. 31, 2011, as stipulated by the current Status of Forces Agreement between Washington and Baghdad, it would have to inform theUnited States quickly. Unless a new agreement is reached soon, the United States will be unable to remain. The implication in theU.S. position is that a complex planning process must be initiated to leave troops there and delays will not allow that process to take place. What is actually going on is that the United States is urging the Iraqi government to change its mind on U.S. withdrawal, and it would like Iraq to change its mind right now in order to influence some of the events taking place in the Persian Gulf. The Shiite uprising in Bahrain and the Saudi intervention, along with events in Yemen, have created an extremely unstable situation in the region, and the United States is afraid that completing the withdrawal would increase the instability. The Iranian Rise The American concern, of course, has to do with Iran. The United States has been unable to block Iranian influence in Iraq’s post-Baathist government. Indeed, the degree to which the Iraqi government is a coherent entity is questionable, and its military and security forces have limited logistical and planning ability and are not capable of territorial defense. The issue is not the intent of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who himself is enigmatic. The problem is that the coalition that governs Iraq is fragmented and still not yet finalized, dominated by Iranian proxies such Muqtadaal-Sadr — and it only intermittently controls the operations of the ministries under it, or the military and security forces. As such, Iraq is vulnerable to the influence of any substantial power, and the most important substantial power following the withdrawal of the United States will be Iran. There has been much discussion of the historic tension between Iraqi Shia and IranianShia, all of which is true. But Iran has been systematically building its influence in Iraq among all factions using money, blackmail and ideology delivered by a sophisticated intelligence service. More important, as the United States withdraws, Iraqis, regardless of their feelings toward Iran (those Iraqis who haven’t always felt this way), are clearly sensing that resisting Iran is dangerous and accommodation with Iran is the only solution. They see Iran as the rising power in the region, and that perception is neither unreasonable nor something to which the United States or Saudi Arabia has an easy counter. The Iraqi government’s response to the American offer has been predictable. While some quietly want the United States to remain, the general response has ranged from dismissal to threats if theUnited States did not leave. Given that the United States has reportedly offered to leave as many as 20,000 troops in a country that 170,000 American troops could not impose order on, the Iraqi perception is that this is merely a symbolic presence and that endorsing it would get Iraq into trouble with Iran, which has far more than 20,000 troops and ever-present intelligence services. It is not clear that the Iraqis were ever prepared to allow U.S. troops to remain, but 20,000 is enough to enrage Iran and not enough to deal with the consequences. The American assumption in deciding to leave Iraq — and this goes back to George W. Bush as well as Barack Obama — was that over the course of four years, the United States would be able to leave because it would have created a coherent government and military. The United States underestimated the degree to which fragmentation in Iraq would prevent that outcome and the degree to which Iranian influence would undermine the effort. The United States made a pledge to the American public and a treaty with the Iraqi government to withdraw forces, but the conditions that were expected to develop simply did not. Not coincidentally, the withdrawal of American forces has coincided with tremendous instability in the region, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula. All around the periphery of Saudi Arabia an arc of instability has emerged. It is not that the Iranians engineered it, but they have certainly taken advantage of it. As a result, Saudi Arabia is in a position where it has had to commit forces in Bahrain, is standing by in Yemen, and is even concerned about internal instability given the rise of both reform-minded and Shiite elements at a time of unprecedented transition given the geriatric state of the country’s top four leaders. Iran has certainly done whatever it could to exacerbate this instability, which fits neatly into the Iraqi situation. As the United States leaves Iraq, Iran expects to increase its influence there. Iran normally acts cautiously even while engaged in extreme rhetoric. Therefore, it is unlikely to send conventional forces into Iraq. Indeed, it might not be necessary to do so in order to gain a dominant political position. Nor is it inconceivable that the Iranians could decide to act more aggressively. With theUnited States gone, the risks decline. Saudi Arabia’s Problem The country that could possibly counter Iran in Iraq is Saudi Arabia, which has been known to funnel money to Sunni groups there. Its military is no match for Iran’s in a battle for Iraq, and its influence there has been less than Iran’s among most groups. More important, as the Saudis face the crisis on their periphery they are diverted and preoccupied by events to the east and south. The unrest in the region, therefore, increases the sense of isolation of some Iraqis and increases their vulnerability to Iran. Thus, given that Iraq is Iran’s primary national security concern, the events in the Persian Gulf work to Iran’s advantage. The United States previously had an Iraq question. That question is being answered, and not to the American advantage. Instead, what is emerging is a Saudi Arabian question. Saudi Arabiacurrently is clearly able to handle unrest within its borders. It has also been able to suppress the Shia in Bahrain — for now, at least. However, its ability to manage its southern periphery with Yemenis being tested, given that the regime in Sanaa was already weakened by multiple insurgencies and is now being forced from office after more than 30 years in power. If the combined pressure of internal unrest, turmoil throughout the region and Iranian manipulation continues, the stress on the Saudis could become substantial. The basic problem the Saudis face is that they don’t know the limits of their ability (which is not much beyond their financial muscle) to manage the situation. If they miscalculate and overextend, they could find themselves in an untenable position. Therefore, the Saudis must be conservative. They cannot afford miscalculation. From the Saudi point of view, the critical element is a clear sign of long-term American commitment to the regime. American support for the Saudis in Bahrain has been limited, and the United States has not been aggressively trying to manage thesituation in Yemen, given its limited ability to shape an outcome there. Coupled with the American position on Iraq, which is that it will remain only if asked — and then only with limited forces — the Saudis are clearly not getting the signals they want from theUnited States. In fact, what further worsens the Saudi position is that they cannot overtly align with the United States for their security needs. Nevertheless, they also have no other option. Exploiting this Saudi dilemma is a key part of the Iranian strategy. The smaller countries of the Arabian Peninsula, grouped withSaudi Arabia in the Gulf Cooperation Council, have played the role of mediator in Yemen, but ultimately they lack the force needed by a credible mediator — a potential military option to concentrate the minds of the negotiating parties. For that, they need theUnited States. It is in this context that the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, will be visiting Washington on April 26. The UAE is one of the few countries on the Arabian Peninsula that has not experienced significant unrest. As such, it has emerged as one of the politically powerful entities in the region. We obviously cannot know what the UAE is going to ask the United States for, but we would be surprised if it wasn’t for a definitive sign that the United Stateswas prepared to challenge the Iranian rise in the region. The Saudis will be watching the American response very carefully. Their national strategy has been to uncomfortably rely on theUnited States. If the United States is seen as unreliable, the Saudis have only two options. One is to hold their position and hope for the best. The other is to reach out and see if some accommodation can be made with Iran. The tensions betweenIran and Saudi Arabia — religious, cultural, economic and political — are profound. But in the end, the Iranians want to be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, defining economic, political and military patterns. On April 18, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’sadviser for military affairs, Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, warned Saudi Arabia that it, too, could be invaded on the same pretext that the kingdom sent forces into Bahrain to suppress a largely Shiite rising there. Then, on April 23, the commander of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Maj. Gen. Mohammad AliJaafari, remarked that Iran’s military might was stronger than that of Saudi Arabia and reminded the United States that its forces in the region were within range of Tehran’s weapons. Again, the Iranians are not about to make any aggressive moves, and such statements are intended to shape perception and force the Saudis to capitulate on the negotiating table. The Saudis want regime survival above all else. Deciding between facing Iran alone or reaching an unpleasant accommodation, the Saudis have little choice. We would guess that one of the reasons the UAE is reaching out to Obama is to try to convince him of the dire consequences of inaction and to move the United States into a more active role. A Strategy of Neglect The Obama administration appears to have adopted an increasingly obvious foreign policy. Rather than simply attempt to control events around the world, the administration appears to have selected a policy of careful neglect. This is not, in itself, a bad strategy. Neglect means that allies and regional powers directly affected by the problem will take responsibility for the problem. Most problems resolve themselves without the need of American intervention. If they don’t, the United States can consider its posture later. Given that the world has become accustomed to the United States as first responder, other countries have simply waited for the American response. We have seen this in Libya, where the United States has tried to play a marginal role. Conceptually, this is not unsound. The problem is that this will work only when regional powers have the weight to deal with the problem and where the outcome is not crucial to American interests. Again, Libya is an almost perfect example of this. However, the Persian Gulf is an area of enormous interest to the United States because of oil. Absent the United States, the regional forces will not be able to contain Iran. Therefore, applying this strategy to the Persian Gulf creates a situation of extreme risk for the United States. Re-engagement in Iraq on a level that would deter Iran is not a likely option, not only because of the Iraqi position but also because the United States lacks the force needed to create a substantial deterrence that would not be attacked and worn down by guerrillas. Intruding in the Arabian Peninsula itself is dangerous for a number reasons, ranging from the military challenge to the hostility an American presence could generate. A pure naval and air solution lacks the ability to threaten Iran’s center of gravity, its large ground force. Therefore, the United States is in a difficult position. It cannot simply decline engagement nor does it have the ability to engage at this moment — and it is this moment that matters. Nor does it have allies outside the region with the resources and appetite for involvement. That leaves the United States with the Saudi option — negotiate with Iran, a subject I’ve written on before. This is not an easy course, nor a recommended one, but when all other options are gone, you go with what you have. The pressure from Iran is becoming palpable. All of the Arab countries feel it, and whatever their feelings about the Persians, the realities of power are what they are. The UAE has been sent to ask the United States for a solution. It is not clear the United States has one. When we ask why the price of oil is surging, the idea of geopolitical risk does come to mind. It is not a foolishspeculation. |
lunes, 23 de mayo de 2011
Artículo No. 8 Iraq, Iran and the Next Move April 26, 2011 By George Friedman
Artículo No. 7 LA JORNADA 18.5.11 BAJO LA LUPA Por Alfredo JALIFE-RAHME GUERRA SEXUAL DE LA DIVISAS: CASTRACIÓN DE DSK Y ESTUPRO DEL EURO.
Ante el empuje otomano en 1452,los exegetas del decadente imperio bizantino discutían estérilmente el sexo de los ángeles.
Un barómetro de la decadencia de los imperios se refleja en el nivel intelectual de susdisquisiciones,como sucede en “Occidente”,volcado en escándalos eróticos,a defecto de mayor sustancia:Berlusconi,John Edwards,Schwarzeneger,y Dominique Strauss-Kahn(DSK).
Varios mitos fundacionales del viejo continente se basan en raptos:desde aquel de “Europa”,la princesa fenicia de Tiro por Zeus ,hasta el de las Sabinas por el rey romano Rómulo.
Los otrora fecundos (literalmente) actos fundacionales “occidentales”----que explican creativamente las hibridaciones biológicas y propedéuticas de sus pueblos cuando todavía no existía EU---,han degenerado en aquelarres politizados de corte economicista ,al estilo del vestido azul mancillado de la israelí-estadunidense Mónica Lewinsky con Clinton (debido,anuestro juicio,a su progresista reforma de salud que infligía severos daños a la industria farmacéutica)y se han degradado en escándalos de burdel de corte financierista,comosucedió en Manhattan con Eliot Spitzer(ES),ex-gobernador de Nueva York,apresado por la temible policía local(NYPD,por sus siglas en inglés).
¿Quien controla a quién en Manhattan?¿La NYPD al mundo financiero de Wall Street,esdecir,a los “amos del universo” y sus inimputables“trece banqueros”(los nuevos Dioses mitológicos del Olimpo financierista estadunidense), o al revés? Esta es la clave pare elucidar la asombrosa celeridad y eficiencia de la NYPD en un fin de semana----mientras jugaban beisbol “los mulos(sic) de Manhattan”,mejor conocidos como “los yanquis de Nueva York”----para apresar ignominiosamente al indefendible DSK.
Después del escándalo sexual del israelí-estadunidense y neoconservador straussiano PaulDundes Wolfowitz-----arquitecto del fracaso militar en Iraq--- cuando fungía como director del Banco Mundial que le subvencionaba sus amoríos clandestinos,ahora toca el turno del escarnio púb(l)ico a DSK,director malhadado del FMI.
Que DSK haya caído en una trampa en un hotel francés de Manhattan en su suite deUS$3,000 al día,o haya sido motivo de un montaje bien armado con una recamarera de Guinea de 32 años (cuya efigie todavía no emerge a la luz púb(l)ica),o haya sido atrapado in fraganti en su recidivista frenesí sexual,no varia en absoluto los antecedentes del hoy aniquilado director del FMI ni las consecuencias que se han desatado en Francia y elmundo:castrado para descolgar la presidencia gala y prácticamente defenestrado de la dirección del FMI que se disputan sin decoro las aves de rapiña del financierismo global.
Tal es el “occidente” del siglo 21 consagrado a linchar a los abatidos cuando se atreven a confrontar el vigente orden mundial,aunque se encuentre en conspicua retirada.El corolario es también verdadero:la inmunidad judicial de sus genocidas globales desde Iraq(BabyBush,Tony Blair y José María Aznar López)hasta Acteal y Aguas Blancas(Zedillo).
¿Cuántos ES o DSK no existirán en Manhattan que gocen de la inimputablidad del ordenfinancierista de Wall Street?
¿Será diferente la vida sexual y/o las pretendidas “desviaciones” de los omnipotentes “trece banqueros” de Walll Street que gobiernan al mundo,a la de los herejes de Wall Streetperseguidos implacablemente,como ES y DSK?
Mas allá de la hipócrita pudibundez puritana de la ciudad de “la manzana”(en alusión al primigenio pecado bíblico)no faltará quienes aduzcan la justicia divina,así como la virtuosa incorruptibilidad del sistema judicial newyorkino(que se cuece a parte del resto delpaís,justamente debido a la ubicación de Wall Street y la ONU)que encarcela “ciegamente”,como debe operar una jurisprudencia regeneradora de la armonía social, hasta un poderoso financiero “global” de la talla de DSK,un fariseo “socialista(sic)” de carros de lujo y trajes de US$20,000 la pieza,quien ahora está confinado en la legendaria cárcel de la isla Rikers junto a otros delincuentes del lumpen .
La metáfora de la “justicia divina”(seguimos en el Olimpo financierista) es apabullante:elvilipendiado FMI se da el lujo de negar rescates financieros a los países del mundo derrelicto---o ,en el mejor de los casos,aplica “condicionalidades” castrantes a los ciudadanos de la periferia subyugada para que pueda vivir lujosa y parasitariamente el vigente orden mundial,aunque en obscena decadencia(en tanto no exista un sucedáneo sucesor multipolar) -----,mientras a su director DSK,la jueza de Manhattan le niega tanto la fianza de $1 millón como el brazalete detector.
Recientemente DSK había confesado sus tres vulnerabilidades: “dinero,las mujeres y ser judío”.Ya lo sabíamos.
En forma premonitoria,como acaba de publicar el rotativo galo Liberation(portavoz de los “socialistas”),DKS había advertido que podía ser motivo de un montaje sexual por $1 Millón(Mail On Line;17.5.11).Se le cumplieron sus agüeros ,pero le saldrá mucho mas caro enManhattan donde un juicio cuesta infinitamente mas que en París.
Según el portal alemán Der Spiegel(16.5.11)“son malas noticias para el euro”,a nuestrojuicio,enfrascado en una guerra de las divisas sin cuartel contra el dólar.
A DSK le correspondió el lanzamiento del euro en el gobierno “socialista” de Lionel Jospin en 1998.
DSK fue demasiado eurocéntrico ,rescatando al despreciado PIG(acrónimo anglosajón dePortugal,Irlanda, Grecia)cuando a quien se requiere salvar antes que a nadie es aldólar,todavía la quintaesencia del desfalleciente orden mundial unipolar.
En sincronía afiliada y afilada con los banqueros esclavistas Rothschild,el megaespeculadorcon disfraz de “filántropo” George Soros,el mafioso Mac Reich y Joseph Stiglitz(¡para lo que sirven los Premios Nobel de Economía!),DSK se había pronunciado por la sepultura del dólar como divisa de reserva de última instancia ,para ser sustituido por los “Derechos Especiales de Giro”.
Como Saddam,Khadafi y el CCPAG-6(ver Bajo la Lupa;15.5.11) ,DSK declaró la guerra financiera al dólar y a Manhattan,perdón,a Wall Street,a su cuenta y riesgo.
Cuando se avizora en el radar un tsunami financiero a partir de fin de junio(GEAB No.55;16.5.11;y confesión pornográfica del ex-primer británico Gordon Brown;The DailyTelegraph,16.5.11), ¿Sufre el euro un estupro, como las doncellas de reciente adopción global, de parte del dólar----pese a encontrarse en caída libre----cuando cada quien de los grandes de la Tierra lucha por su supervivencia individual?
DSK había cometido varias impudicias de lesa majestad contra el orden mundial unipolar,aúncon asiento en Manhattan.
A reserva de ahondar próximamente,baste señalar la reciente blasfemia anti-unipolar de DSK para “regular” la globalización financierista (Mike Whitney;ICH;15 y 17.5.11).
El muy bien informado Pat Buchanan lo resume espléndida y geopolíticamente(Real ClearPolitics;6.5.11): “el escándalo sexual del FMI fue un pésimo día para el “nuevo(sic) orden mundial”.
Parodiando a Clausewitz:¿La doble emasculación de DSK y el FMI es la continuación de la guerra financiera global con armas sexuales?
Artículo No. 6 Protests Spread in Syria April 22, 2011 | stratfor
Summary
Tens of thousands of people demonstrated across Syria on April 22, calling for an end to the regime of President Bashar al Assad. Protests have been growing in numbers since March 15, and more and more of those taking to the streets have begun to call for regime change, as opposed to mere political reforms. Syria’s Alawite regime is faced with a serious dilemma inchoosing how to deal with the rising, and while al Assad still does not appear to be in imminent jeopardy of losing power, the sectarian fault lines in the country have the potential to rupture, should the demonstrations continue to increase in intensity and scope.
Analysis
At least 38 people have reportedly been killed as tens of thousands of protesters demonstrated across Syria on April 22. The demonstrations, held days after President Basharal Assad lifted the country’s decades-old state of emergency, mark the sixth straight week of unrest in the country. Original attempts at “Day of Rage” protests in February largely failed, but demonstrations began again in earnest March 15 with a few hundred protesters in Damascus. From there, they eventually spread to nearly every other population center in the country. The protest movement has posed the most serious challenge to the al Assad regime since he took over for his father in 2000.
The Syrian rising is not being conducted by a single group, nor is it guided by a unified ideology. There are pro-democracy elements, but also ethnic and sectarian elements to the demonstrations. The majority Sunni population has led the challenge against the minorityAlawite regime (Alawites are considered an offshoot of Shia Islam) and has been joined by Kurdish protesters in the northeast as well as by small groups of demonstrators in the Druze areas to the southwest. At the same time, even Alawite strongholds in the coastal city ofLatakia have witnessed violent demonstrations. Damascus claims that foreign instigation has played a hand in the unrest and has increasingly shifted its rhetoric to brand protesters as armed terrorists. Concurrently, an increasingly larger segment of the protest movement has begun to intensify its rhetoric from demanding political reforms to advocating regime change.
The regime has not hesitated to use force to put down demonstrations in areas where it deems them especially threatening. The use of the Syrian army — and live ammunition — against demonstrators first occurred March 18 in the southern city of Daraa, a stronghold forSyria’s conservative Sunni population. The army subsequently was deployed to the coastal cities of Latakia and Banias to contain demonstrations numbering in the thousands. The central town of Homs has been the latest Syrian city to see considerable amounts of violence as the army has tried to quell a revolt. Indeed, the Syrian interior ministry issued a statement April 18 specifically citing Homs and Banias as places where the regime was attempting to put down and “armed insurrection.” Protests also have occurred regularly in the Kurdish areas in northeastern Syria, a major cause for concern for Turkey, which fears a spillover of Kurdish unrest across the border. Meanwhile, unrest in Damascus — and especially in a nearby suburb called Douma — has been a constant, resulting in several deaths at the hands of security forces. (The regime counters that several of its police officers and soldiers have been killed as well.)
Al Assad also has attempted to mollify the demonstrators with concessions. Since mid-March, he has dissolved the special National Security Court; fired the governors of Baniasand Daraa governorates (where the army had cracked down violently on demonstrators); dissolved his Cabinet and named a new prime minister; promised citizenship rights to tens of thousands of Kurds; and promised a new party law that will, in theory, end the Syrian BaathParty’s monopoly on power. Arguably the most significant of al Assad’s concessions was the lifting of the state of emergency law, which has been in effect since the Baathists took power in 1963. The law had given legal cover for Syria’s internal security services to act without constraint in quashing any resistance to the Alawite regime since the Hafez al Assadpresidency and had been a focus for demonstrators’ ire. Those that remain on the streets, however, point to the fact that just as the state of emergency was lifted, a new law requiring all demonstrations to first have the approval of the interior ministry (which, in the current environment, is unlikely) largely renders the scrapping of the emergency law irrelevant.
Syria’s regime faces a dilemma. Al Assad cannot let up on the security crackdown and allow protests when the demonstrations have begun to take on such an anti-regime tone. However, if he decides to harden the crackdowns, all the concessions he has made thus far will be nullified in the eyes of the protesters, who will likely consider disingenuous any future pledges of reform from the regime. Al Assad has maintained the loyalty of all pillars of support within the Syrian state thus far, and the demonstrations themselves have yet to become large enough to pose an immediate threat to his position, but the Alawite-Sunni power relationship in the country could explode if the situation were to escalate. If that were to happen, the writ of the state would likely weaken considerably inside Syria’s borders, which would have a destabilizing effect beyond them as well.
Artículo No. 5 No Fly Zone in Libya Fails, UN Ground Forces To Cause African War By Itar-Tass
April 22, 2011 - -MOSCOW, April 21 (Itar-Tass) -- The situation in Libya is stalled. The no fly zone operation has failed, and an operation on the ground, if it begins, will trigger a large African war, Russian presidential representative for African affairs, chairman of the Federation Council’s international affairs committee, Mikhail Margelov, said on Thursday.
“That this is a stalemate situation is seen in the fact that without a ground operation attempts to oust Gaddafi have failed, and resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council the coalition has already interpreted very loosely does not permit interference by infantry or paratroops,” Margelov told Itar-Tass. “The United States, France and Britain think that bombs alone are not enough to fulfill the part of the resolution that concerns the protection of civilian population. In their opinion, as long as there is Gaddafi, there will be a risk to the lives of civilians.”
However, if a ground operation begins, then, according to Margelov, "a war of this scale will not be kept within Libya."
"The area of ··the Sahel is already unstable, and the countries of that zone – Mali and Niger – are getting arms from the rebels in the theater of military operations in Libya for factions of al-Qaeda,” said the special envoy. This, he warns, "poses a threat to Algeria and Morocco, where the opposition continues to protest and demonstrate. "
In addition, the complexity of the situation in Libya, according to Margelov, stems from the fact that "it is still not clear with whom one can negotiate a political settlement, because the rebels are a very ill-matched: there are regional tribes, Libyan Berbers, some defectors from the ruling regime and al-Qaeda militants.”
"At the same time,” Margelov added, "the insurgents and the coalition do not want any talks with Gaddafi. "
Speaking of the impasse, Margelov remarked once again that "after the statement by the coalition command about the lack of missiles it became clear that the no fly zone operation failed. Gaddafi has been successfully advancing and his troops are well armed."
However, some politicians have been claiming that "the rebels are being pushed back with Russian weapons." Margelov firmly dismissed these rumors "an exaggeration", because one can talk about only Soviet weapons of the 1980s.
"Russia,” he recalled, “in 1992 joined the UN Security Council sanctions prohibiting the supply of weapons to Libya. In addition, in the 1980s Qaddafi, according to the legislator, "scooped handfuls of weapons not only in the Warsaw Pact countries, but also in Europe." So the supporters of Gaddafi "are fighting with weapons of mixed origin," concluded Margelov.
Artículo No. 4 Women have emerged as key players in the Arab spring Through protesting, organising, blogging and hunger-striking, women have taken a central role, but it remains to be seen whether their rights will improve
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In a small room in Benghazi some young men and women are putting out a new opposition newspaper. "The role of the female in Libya," reads one headline. "She is the Muslim, the mother, the soldier, the protester, the journalist, the volunteer, the citizen", it adds.
Arab women can claim to have been all these things and more during the three months of tumult that have shaken the region. Some of the most striking images of this season of revolt have been of women: black-robed and angry, a sea of female faces in the capitals of north Africa, the Arabian peninsula, the Syrian hinterland, marching for regime change, an end to repression, the release of loved ones. Or else delivering speeches to the crowds, treating the injured, feeding the sit-ins of Cairo and Manama and the makeshift army of eastern Libya.
and Libya, Bahrain and Syria, one thing is clear: for all their organising, marching, rabble-rousing, blogging, hunger-striking, and, yes, dying, Arab women are barely one small step forwards on the road to greater equality with their menfolk. Women may have sustained the Arab spring, but it remains to be seen if the Arab spring will sustain women.
The first protests
From the earliest rumblings of discontent in Tunisia at the turn of the year, it was clear that old images of Arab women as deferential, subservient and generally indoors would have to be revised. From the highly-educated Tunisian female elite of doctors, barristers and university professors to the huge numbers of unemployed female graduates, women were key players in the uprising that launched the Arab spring.
In Cairo, they were instrumental not just in protests but in much of the nitty-gritty organisation that turned TahrirSquare from a moment into a movement. Women were involved in arranging food deliveries, blankets, the stage and medical help. In Yemen, it was a young woman, Tawakul Karman, who first led demonstrations on a university campus against the long rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Karman emerged as one of the leaders of a revolution still yet to run its course.
In Bahrain, women were among the first wave that descended on Pearl Square in the capital – some with their children – to demand change. And the Bahraini movement has latterly found a figurehead in Zainab al-Khawaja, the woman who went on hunger strike in protest at the beating and arrest of her father, husband and brother-in-law. "Women have played a hugely influential role this time and put themselves in danger," said Nabeel Rajab, president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights. "They treated the injured in the streets and nursed them in their homes when they were too afraid to go to hospital."
In Libya, women were at the vanguard too, when mothers, sisters and widows of men killed in a prison massacre in 1996 protested outside a courthouse in Benghazi after their lawyer was arrested.
"Someone gave me a placard and I was not even sure what to do with it because we had never done anything like this before," said Muna Sahli, a literature lecturer at Garyounis University in Benghazi, whose brother-in-law was killed in the prison slaughter. "I even forgot to cover my face so I wouldn't be identified."
In Syria and Yemen, more conservative societies, it took longer for women to join the movement en masse. In both countries, it took leadership blunders by the authorities to draw them in. In Syria, hundreds of women marched through the town of Beida to deplore the indiscriminate detention of many of their menfolk. In Yemen, when president Saleh said it was un-Islamic for male and female protesters to march side by side, thousands of women poured on to the streets just to prove him wrong. Women continue to support the demonstrations, working as nurses in makeshift hospitals and in ambulances, cooking food, delivering speeches and singing songs at the demonstrations. To the right of the main stage in Tagheer (meaning "change") Square, there is a large cordoned-off area filled with hundreds of women, most of them wearing black abayas, and small children.
On the frontline
Women have not escaped the human cost of this uprising. During the police repression of the Tunisian revolution, they were beaten by security thugs, and in rural areas around Kasserine some were raped by police after demonstrations. There were several reports of rape in Egypt amid the hurly burly, and a South African reporter for the US network CBS was sexually assaulted. In a notorious case in Tripoli, a woman,Iman al-Obeidi said she was raped by about 15 pro-Gaddafi militia
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Women of the regime
Legality, sorority, equality
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