The 27 countries in the European Union derived 31 percent of their electricity needs and 14.6 of their primary energy consumption from nuclear power in 2010. In roughly the last eight years, there has been a considerable momentum on the Continent to boost that capacity. Countries that had halted the construction of new reactors (Germany and Sweden) or effectively abandoned nuclear power altogether (Italy and Poland) had been considering reversing their moratoriums, phase-outs and outright bans. Three factors spurred the momentum toward a nuclear Renaissance in Europe: Almost 25 years of accident-free nuclear industry since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986; technological improvements in the design of reactors; and a geopolitical impetus to wrestle the Continent from the grip of Russian energy exports following a number of politically motivated Russian natural gas cutoffs. There has also been a concerted push byEurope’s indigenous nuclear energy industry to open up the potential EU market of 400 million people for the sale of its latest generation of nuclear reactors. The March 11 9.0-magnitude Tohoku earthquake in Japan and its subsequent effect on the Fukushima Daiichi and Daini nuclear power plants has dampened — and even ended — enthusiasm for nuclear power in some European nations, however. The combination of the powerful earthquake and massive tsunami that hit Japan’s Pacific Coast where the two affected power plants were situated sparked the nuclear crisis in Japan. TheFukushima accident is still ongoing and developing. It is at this point assumed that the reactors in the nuclear plants in question were shut down immediately following the seismic activity, as they were designed to. The onsite backup generators that were supposed to cool down the core also shut down about an hour after the earthquake, however. The leading theory is that they were damaged by the subsequent tsunami. Europe is un likely to see an earthquake of similar proportions and even less likely to see a similar tsunami. Even so, a tradition of anti-nuclear industry activism in a number of European countries and contemporary political dynamics could engender a move against a European nuclear revival post-Fukushima. It is important to emphasize that not all European countries are similarly situated. France and Germany, for example, approach nuclear energy from diametrically opposed perspectives. In France, the nuclear power industry — and military capacity it spawned — for decades has been perceived as a guarantor of French independence and global relevance, whereas in Germany, nuclear power has negative connotations due to the country’s nearly 50-year status as the likely nuclear battlefield between the Cold War superpowers. Environmental movements accordingly have evolved along different lines, and national psyches approach nuclear power from starkly different perspectives. The European countries below are listed from most to least likely to see plans for nuclear projects altered in the wake of theFukushima accident. Germany Germany’s nuclear program was the first to be politically damaged by the Fukushima accident. German Chancellor Angela Merkel on March 14 put on hold for three months plans approved narrowly by the Bundestag in October 2010 to prolong the life of Germany’s 17 nuclear reactors by an average of 12 years, a decision that is still contested before the highest German constitutional court. On March 15, Merkel extended the German government response by stating that the nuclear reactors that began operating before 1980 would be shut down and remain so for the period of the announced three-month moratorium. The Isar 1 nuclear reactor in the city of Essenbach has begun preparation for a shutdown. Government officials in the state of Brandenburg and the city ofBerlin have also asked Poland to reconsider its plans for a nuclear revival. The decision by Berlin is not surprising to STRATFOR for two reasons: long-held anti-nuclear sentiment in the country that draws its roots in the country’s Cold War role and the contemporary political environment. The Cold War and the status of Germany as a pseudo-independent battleground between East and the West have had a profound impact on German sentiment toward nuclear power. Peace and Green movements that emerged from Europe’s 1968 student protests were grafted on to the reality in West Germany that the country lacked real say over its foreign policy and would most likely be first to face annihilation in a nuclear exchange between the two Cold War superpowers. Nuclear power — and the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany — became the ultimate symbol of Berlin’s subservience to U.S. interests. The 1979 Three Mile Island incident in the United States and the 1986 Chernobyldisaster in what was then the Soviet republic of Ukraine greatly reinforced this anti-nuclear sentiment. No reactors were built inGermany after Chernobyl. To this day, Germans remain far more skeptical of the benefits of nuclear technology — from food irradiation to nuclear power plants — than most Europeans. Strong environmentalist and anti-nuclear-weapon sentiment inGermany led to the emergence of Germany’s Green Party, which is one of the world’s most successful environmentalist parties in terms of actually getting into government. The Green Party negotiated the Nuclear Exit Law during its time in a governing coalition with the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 2000. The law called for all German nuclear reactors to be shut down by 2021. Merkel had to uphold the agreement when she entered a Grand Coalition with the SPD in 2005 but was vocal about the need to change it throughout the duration of her party’s uneasy marriage with the center-left. She ultimately got her way following September 2009 elections and the formation of a new coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The 12-year extension, however, has been largely unpopular inGermany. Polls have shown a consistent unease about nuclear power. The 2010 Eurobarometer study — which has standardized methodology across 27 EU member states and is therefore the only Continent-wide study we can rely on for an assessment of European attitudes toward nuclear power — shows 52 percent of respondents in Germany wanting the current level of nuclear power reliance reduced — by far the greatest percentage among major European countries. Considering that the study was conducted more than a year before the Fukushima accident, it is likely that the sentiments toward nuclear power have only turned more negative. Merkel has countered that nuclear reactors need to be extended to act as a “bridge” to renewable energy. Her opponents among the environmental and left wing parties have argued that the bridge argument is a pretext for the center-right to facilitate the development of new power plants in the future. The center-left argument may not be far from the truth. While Germany is indeed one of the global leaders in renewable energy — it derived about 16 percent of its electricity from renewable sources in 2009 — it is difficult to see how it would manage to replace the approximately 27 percent of electricity derived from nuclear power with renewable sources by 2035. Although studies show that it would be possible to accomplish that task, the shutting down of reactors according to the Nuclear Exit Law would have begun already in 2010, with four in total shut down by 2011. Replacing so much lost capacity on the front end with renewable sources would be difficult if not impossible. The alternative is turning to other conventional sources — namely Russian natural gas — to fill in the gap left by abandoning nuclear power. Despite Berlin’s generally positive relationship withMoscow, Germany does want to give Russia any more of an upper hand in its energy relationship. Germany already gets around 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia, a number that may very well increase with the coming online of the 55 billion-cubic-meter (bcm) Nordstream natural gas pipeline at the end of 2011. Merkel may therefore have gambled on the issue for the sake of German energy independence, calculating that popular sentiment would catch up to the geopolitical needs of the country at some point. This calculation has now backfired on Merkel. The German government already has suffered a blow to its popularity due toBerlin’s signing off on the eurozone bailouts of Greece and Irelandand Merkel’s insistence on defending the euro in perpetuity with a major 500 billion euro ($698 billion) bailout facility. There have been a number of other problems for Merkel’s CDU along the way, from general infighting of the coalition government to a number of high-profile resignations, namely that of President Horst Koehler, the forced resignation of Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zuGuttenberg, and the announced retirement of BundesbankPresident Axel Weber. Germany is set to hold seven state elections in 2011; the first on Feb. 20, held in the city-state of Hamburg, saw Merkel’s CDU defeated. Merkel’s policy of extending the life of current reactors has come at a very bad time, especially with a critical state, Baden-Wuerttemberg, holding elections March 27. Baden-Wuerttemberg is home to Stuttgart, one of Germany’s most important industrial centers, has the third-largest GDP and population and is considered a conservative stronghold that the CDU has ruled since 1953. It is also the site of four major reactors — and the site of a March 12 protest of nearly 50,000 against the extension of nuclear power that was planned before theFukushima accident. The situation for Merkel’s CDU in the state is very serious, perhaps prompting the CDU Baden-Wuerttembergenvironment minister to say in an interview March 14 that the two oldest reactors in the state could be closed down in 2011 if Merkel continues the moratorium, likely a move to improve the CDU’selectoral chances two weeks before the election. Merkel is likely positioning the three-month suspension on extending the life of reactors due to the upcoming state elections in Saxony-Anhalt on March 20 and in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Palatine on March 27, buying time until the Fukushima accident blows over — though it is unclear if or when that will happen. Furthermore, with sentiment against nuclear power inGermany ever strong, and now resurging, the industry’s future inGermany looks very grim. The wider question is what will happen to Merkel’s CDU if the accident leads to a loss of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Such a loss would bring back memories of the SPD’s loss of its traditional power base of North-Rhine Westphalia in 2005, a loss that ultimately forced Gerhard Schroeder to call early federal elections leading the way for Merkel to assume power. Political instability in Germany at a time when the eurozone crisis is ongoing would have ramifications far beyond just the nuclear industry. While ultimately the alternative to CDU — an SPD-Green government — would have a policy toward Europe not much different from Merkel’s, the election campaign in the midst of the ongoing European economic troubles would have the potential to cause uncertainty. Stakes in Germany are therefore larger than just for the future of nuclear industry, but the future for nuclear power certainly does not look good in the EU’slargest economy and country. Italy Italy was one of the first European countries to build nuclear reactors for power generation. Unlike the rest of Europe, it did not feel impelled to commit itself to nuclear power after the 1973 oil shocks due to its relatively plentiful natural gas deposits, which at the end of 1988 stood at 330 bcm. In 1988, Italy’s domestic natural gas production was able to satisfy about 40 percent of its natural gas consumption, but by 2008 that percent has dwindled to just less than 11 percent. Because of the decision not to build any nuclear power plants in the window between 1973 and 1979 (prior to the Three Mile Island incident), before the public opinion in Europe soured on nuclear power, Italy now finds itself importing around 14 percent of its electricity needs from abroad and in absolute terms is one of the largest electricity importers in the world. Its large electricity imports mean Italy has higher electricity costs than most of its European neighbors. A high reliance on natural gas for electricity generation also means a high reliance on natural gas imports. While Germanyimported in 2008 more natural gas from Russia (36.2 bcm) thanItaly (24.5 bcm), Italy is far more dependent on natural gas for electricity generation than Germany (54 percent compared to only around 18 percent, respectively). It imports 29 percent of its natural gas needs from Russia, a number likely to rise in 2011 due to the interruption of Libya’s exports to Italy via the Greenstreamunderwater pipeline. This means that Italy not only imports electricity directly from its neighbors — most actually comes from French nuclear power plants — it also imports the bulk of the natural gas used to generate electricity from its natural gas-burning power plants. The unrest in North Africa has highlighted the danger of relying on energy imports from unstable regimes likeLibya. All this makes Italy the European country most in need of nuclear energy, but the anti-nuclear movement in Italy has long been active and powerful, and it became stronger following Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. In the 2010 Eurobarometer survey, 62 percent of Italians wanted to see Italy — which generates no electricity from nuclear power — either reduce or retain the same level of electricity generation from nuclear power. The center-right government of Silvio Berlusconi — which is becoming increasingly unpopular due to a number of scandals and ongoing economic troubles — could now see the opposition use its May 2009 decision to reverse the ban on nuclear power to rally disparate forces against the government. While enthusiasm for the center-left Italian parties is not high, nuclear power is a clear issue that people can identify with and rally around, allowing the center-left to mobilize against Berlusconi. Furthermore, unlike most of their West European brethren, anti-nuclear activists inItaly can point to regular seismic activity in their country, particularly in Italy’s south as a reason to take the Fukushimaaccident seriously. Moreover, the Italian Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the opposition’s call for a referendum on construction of nuclear power plants in January, which means that a referendum on the question will now likely be held between April and June. Popular angst against Berlusconi’s government combined with theFukushima accident could spell an end to the nuclear revival inItaly when the referendum is held in mid-2011. United Kingdom There has been a consensus in the United Kingdom among the center-left Labour party and center-right Conservative party that a return to nuclear power is necessary for British energy independence. Like the government under former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the current government favors building new nuclear reactors, and it wants to build around 10 new reactors by 2020. Following the Fukushima accident, British Energy and Climate Change Secretary Chris Huhne ordered an official investigation to determine what London can learn from the Japanese nuclear crisis on March 14. The United Kingdom only derives 18 percent of its energy from nuclear power, with one reactor built since the Chernobyl disaster. This is in large part due to considerable public opposition to nuclear power. Anti-nuclear protesters in the United Kingdom are among the most active in Europe, and are notorious for at times using militant tactics. The Fukushima disaster could rally nuclear opponents once again. The current junior coalition member, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has traditionally been skeptical of nuclear power and has had to mute its traditional views to become part of the governing coalition with the Conservatives. Thus far, the LDP lawmakers have remained silent on the issue and have not opposed the coalition consensus, but this could change if the Fukushima accident begins to resonate with the public. The LDP already has suffered a loss in popularity for working with the Conservatives on a number of issues, and it may not be able to avoid an argument with its senior coalition partner if it wants to hold on to some semblance of its electoral base. For London, the issue ultimately is one of energy independence. British reserves of North Sea natural gas — which in 2008 supplied the United Kingdom with 45 percent of its electricity generation — are dwindling, going from 760 bcm at the end of 1998 to 340 bcmat the end of 2008. The United Kingdom will increasingly have to rely on imports from Norway to satisfy its natural gas needs. Nonetheless, importing natural gas from Norway is far different than importing it from Russia, which means that nuclear energy is less of a national security issue for the United Kingdom than it may be for other European countries. This means that the United Kingdom has alternatives to nuclear power, which casts the fate of the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom into doubt. Despite the strong interparty consensus on the issue, therefore, the United Kingdom remains a country where public opinion — and anti-nuclear energy activists — will have to be monitored carefully to gauge which way the country will go following the Fukushima incident. Sweden The Swedish center-right government of Prime Minister FredrikReinfeldt reversed a 1980 ban on nuclear power by a 174-172 vote in June 2010 following the Three Mile Island incident. At the time, it was feared that the ban reversal would be short-lived, as national elections were scheduled for September 2010 andReinfeldt’s center-right coalition’s future was uncertain. ButReinfeldt stayed in power, albeit in a minority government. On the question of nuclear power, the government has the support of the far-right Sweden Democrats. Therefore, the lifting of the ban is, for the time being, secure. Reinfeldt said in an interview March 13 that there would be no review and that the “decision still stands.” Unlike most European countries, Sweden actually had an independent nuclear weapons program in the 1950s. Given its proximity to Germany and Russia, Stockholm pursued a policy of neutrality backed by an aggressive military posture and a domestic military industrial complex. Its reactor at Agesta, now closed down, was widely believed to be created to produce weapons-grade plutonium. For Stockholm, nuclear power was seen as the ultimate guarantor of safety, even though it officially abandoned its weapons program. Nuclear power, therefore, does not carry the negative associations in Sweden as it does inGermany. Sweden produces roughly all its electricity from nuclear power and hydropower equally. The problem for Stockholm is that its hydropower capacity has largely been tapped out, and the country has produced roughly the same amount of electricity since its last nuclear reactor came online in 1985. To boost electricity production, the country would either have to import electricity — probably from Finnish nuclear power plants — or natural gas fromNorway or Russia. The government, however, has made it clear that it does not want to boost the use of greenhouse gases, an issue for which it has the support of environmental groups. The strong support of nuclear power by a government that was just elected — a government that is committed to reducing its reliance on greenhouse gases — means Stockholm is likely to stick to its decision to revive its nuclear industry, at least while the current minority government holds power. Moreover,Stockholm can increase the capacity of current reactors via improvements on the current plants and still make a considerable impact on its electricity output. Therefore, it can avoid the controversial issue of building new plants on new sites. Poland The Polish government only recently announced its decision to create a legal framework for building nuclear power reactors. Thedecision was made in February and will likely be voted on by the parliament in June. Support for nuclear power is strong in Poland, with data from the 2010 Eurobarometer survey indicating that 30 percent of respondents wanted an increased use of nuclear power, the highest results in the European Union. With nearly 40 million people and Central Europe’s largest economy (the European Union’s eighth largest), Polish entry into the nuclear club is significant. Poland never had a need for nuclear power plants because its plentiful coal deposits have always provided it with ample supply of domestic fuel for electricity generation. To this day, coal provides 94 percent of Poland’s electricity. The Soviet Unionplanned to construct a nuclear power plant in Poland, but the plans were abandoned in 1990 due to a combination of lack of necessity, environmental fears post Chernobyl and general anti-Soviet sentiment. The Polish public essentially saw nuclear power as part and parcel of Soviet domination, and the half-completedZarnowiec plant was scrapped after half a billion dollars had been spent on construction. Today, however, nuclear power is seen as a way to escape dependence on Russian natural gas exports. With the European Union pushing curbs on greenhouse gases, Poland’s over-dependence on coal is seen as a potential liability. Poland is therefore looking for alternatives in shale gas exploration, liquefied natural gas and, now, nuclear power. Until these alternatives are in place, Poland will have to increase its dependence on piped Russian natural gas as it builds at least three new natural gas power plants, one of which is planned to be built jointly with Russia’s Gazprom by 2017. |
martes, 5 de abril de 2011
Artículo No. 29. Nuclear Power in Europe after Fukushima: A Special Report · March 16, 2011 |
Artículo No. 28 Japan, the Persian Gulf and Energy · March 15, 2011 STRATFOR By George Friedman
| Over the past week, everything seemed to converge on energy. The unrest in the Persian Gulf raised the specter of the disruption of oil supplies to the rest of the world, and an earthquake in Japanknocked out a string of nuclear reactors with potentially devastating effect. Japan depends on nuclear energy and itdepends on the Persian Gulf, which is where it gets most of its oil. It was, therefore, a profoundly bad week for Japan, not only because of the extensive damage and human suffering but also because Japan was being shown that it can’t readily escape the realities of geography. Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, a bit behind Chinanow. It is also the third-largest industrial economy, behind only theUnited States and China. Japan’s problem is that its enormous industrial plant is built in a country almost totally devoid of mineral resources. It must import virtually all of the metals and energy that it uses to manufacture industrial products. It maintains stockpiles, but should those stockpiles be depleted and no new imports arrive, Japan stops being an industrial power. The Geography of Oil There are multiple sources for many of the metals Japan imports, so that if supplies stop flowing from one place it can get them from other places. The geography of oil is more limited. In order to access the amount of oil Japan needs, the only place to get it is the Persian Gulf. There are other places to get some of whatJapan needs, but it cannot do without the Persian Gulf for its oil. This past week, we saw that this was a potentially vulnerable source. The unrest that swept the western littoral of the Arabian Peninsula and the ongoing tension between the Saudis and Iranians, as well as the tension between Iran and the United States, raised the possibility of disruptions. The geography of thePersian Gulf is extraordinary. It is a narrow body of water opening into a narrow channel through the Strait of Hormuz. Any diminution of the flow from any source in the region, let alone the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would have profound implications for the global economy. For Japan it could mean more than higher prices. It could mean being unable to secure the amount of oil needed at any price. The movement of tankers, the limits on port facilities and long-term contracts that commit oil to other places could make it impossible for Japan to physically secure the oil it needs to run its industrial plant. On an extended basis, this would draw down reserves and constrain Japan’s economy dramatically. And, obviously, when the world’s third-largest industrial plant drastically slows, the impact on the global supply chain is both dramatic and complex. In 1973, the Arab countries imposed an oil embargo on the world.Japan, entirely dependent on imported oil, was hit not only by high prices but also by the fact that it could not obtain enough fuel to keep going. While the embargo lasted only five months, the oil shock, as the Japanese called it, threatened Japan’s industrial capability and shocked it into remembering its vulnerability. Japanrelied on the United States to guarantee its oil supplies. The realization that the United States couldn’t guarantee those supplies created a political crisis parallel to the economic one. It is one reason the Japanese are hypersensitive to events in thePersian Gulf and to the security of the supply lines running out of the region. Regardless of other supplies, Japan will always import nearly 100 percent of its oil from other countries. If it cuts its consumption by 90 percent, it still imports nearly 100 percent of its oil. And to the extent that the Japanese economy requires oil — which it does — it is highly vulnerable to events in the Persian Gulf. It is to mitigate the risk of oil dependency — which cannot be eliminated altogether by any means — that Japan employs two alternative fuels: It is the world’s largest importer of seaborne coal, and it has become the third-largest producer of electricity from nuclear reactors, ranking after the United States and Francein total amount produced. One-third of its electricity production comes from nuclear power plants. Nuclear power was critical to both Japan’s industrial and national security strategy. It did not make Japan self-sufficient, since it needed to import coal and nuclear fuel, but access to these resources made it dependent on countries like Australia, which does not have choke points likeHormuz. It is in this context that we need to understand the Japanese prime minister’s statement that Japan was facing its worst crisis since World War II. First, the earthquake and the resulting damage to several of Japan’s nuclear reactors created a long-term regional energy shortage in Japan that, along with the other damage caused by the earthquake, would certainly affect the economy. But the events in the Persian Gulf also raised the 1973 nightmare scenario for the Japanese. Depending how events evolved, the Japanese pipeline from the Persian Gulf could be threatened in a way that it had not been since 1973. Combined with the failure of several nuclear reactors, the Japanese economy is at risk. The comparison with World War II was apt since it also began, in a way, with an energy crisis. The Japanese had invaded China, and after the fall of the Netherlands (which controlled today’sIndonesia) and France (which controlled Indochina), Japan was concerned about agreements with France and the Netherlandscontinuing to be honored. Indochina supplied Japan with tin and rubber, among other raw materials. The Netherlands East Indies supplied oil. When the Japanese invaded Indochina, the United States both cut off oil shipments from the United States and started buying up oil from the Netherlands East Indies to keepJapan from getting it. The Japanese were faced with the collapse of their economy or war with the United States. They chose Pearl Harbor. Today’s situation is in no way comparable to what happened in 1941 except for the core geopolitical reality. Japan is dependent on imports of raw materials and particularly oil. Anything that interferes with the flow of oil creates a crisis in Japan. Anything that risks a cutoff makes Japan uneasy. Add an earthquake destroying part of its energy-producing plant and you force Japaninto a profound internal crisis. However, it is essential to understand what energy has meant to Japan historically — miscalculation about it led to national disaster and access to it remains Japan’s psychological as well as physical pivot. Japan’s Nuclear Safety Net Japan is still struggling with the consequences of its economic meltdown in the early 1990s. Rapid growth with low rates of return on capital created a massive financial crisis. Rather than allow a recession to force a wave of bankruptcies and unemployment, the Japanese sought to maintain their tradition of lifetime employment. To do that Japan had to keep interest rates extremely low and accept little or no economic growth. It achieved its goal, relatively low unemployment, but at the cost of a large debt burden and a long-term sluggish economy. The Japanese were beginning to struggle with the question of what would come after a generation of economic stagnation and full employment. They had clearly not yet defined a path, although there was some recognition that a generation’s economic reality could not sustain itself. The changes that Japan would face were going to be wrenching, and even under the best of circumstances, they would be politically difficult to manage. Suddenly, Japan is not facing the best of circumstances. It is not yet clear how devastating the nuclear-reactor damage will prove to be, but the situation appears to be worsening. What is clear is that the potential crisis in the Persian Gulf, the loss of nuclear reactors and the rising radiation levels will undermine the confidence of the Japanese. Beyond the human toll, these reactors were Japan’s hedge against an unpredictable world. They gave it control of a substantial amount of its energy production. Even if the Japanese still had to import coal and oil, there at least a part of their energy structure was largely undertheir own control and secure. Japan’s nuclear power sector seemed invulnerable, which no other part of its energy infrastructure was. For Japan, a country that went to war with theUnited States over energy in 1941 and was devastated as a result, this was no small thing. Japan had a safety net. The safety net was psychological as much as anything. The destruction of a series of nuclear reactors not only creates energy shortages and fear of radiation; it also drives home the profound and very real vulnerability underlying all of Japan’s success.Japan does not control the source of its oil, it does not control the sea lanes over which coal and other minerals travel, and it cannot be certain that its nuclear reactors will not suddenly be destroyed. To the extent that economics and politics are psychological, this is a huge blow. Japan lives in constant danger, both from nature and from geopolitics. What the earthquake drove home was just how profound and how dangerous Japan’s world is. It is difficult to imagine another industrial economy as inherently insecure asJapan’s. The earthquake will impose many economic constraints on Japan that will significantly complicate its emergence from its post-boom economy, but one important question is the impact on the political system. Since World War II, Japan has coped with its vulnerability by avoiding international entanglements and relying on its relationship with the United States. It sometimes wondered whether the United States, with its sometimes-unpredictable military operations, was more of a danger than a guarantor, but its policy remained intact. It is not the loss of the reactors that will shake Japan the most but the loss of the certainty that the reactors were their path to some degree of safety, along with the added burden on the economy. The question is how the political system will respond. In dealing with the Persian Gulf, will Japan continue to follow the American lead or will it decide to take a greater degree of control and follow its own path? The likelihood is that a shaken self-confidence will make Japan more cautious and even more vulnerable. But it is interesting to look at Japanese history and realize that sometimes, and not always predictably, Japan takes insecurity as a goad to self-assertion. This was no ordinary earthquake in magnitude or in the potential impact on Japan’s view of the world. The earthquake shook a lot of pieces loose, not the least of which were in the Japanese psyche. Japan has tried to convince itself that it had provided a measure of security with nuclear plants and an alliance with theUnited States. Given the earthquake and situation in the Persian Gulf, recalculation is in order. But Japan is a country that has avoided recalculation for a long time. The question now is whether the extraordinary vulnerability exposed by the quake will be powerful enough to shake Japan into recalculating its long-standing political system. |
Artículo No. 27 Asia Times 25.3.11 Why Turkey recalibrated its Libya stance By M K Bhadrakumar
Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz, the tall, handsome, urbane Saudi foreign minister, has no peers. In a career spanning 36 years, he was a key player in so many high dramas that one loses count - the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan jihad, the Gulf War, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the September 11, 2001 attack, the US invasion of Afghanistan andIraq. That is, leaving out his profound contribution to the realignment of Saudi Arabia's post-Cold War foreign policy, especially with China.
But the unscheduled visit of a few hours late in the evening last Thursday to the Turkish capital of Ankara was a daunting mission to pin Turkey down to a favorable stance on the momentous developments in the region. Ankara, whose ties with Tehran dramatically improved in the recent past, had begun treading on the first circle of Saudi interests.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had just characterized the Saudi intervention in Bahrain as "a new Karbala". The reference was to the battle that took place in 680 between the forces of the Prophet Mohammad's grandson Husain ibn Ali and Umayyad caliph Yazid II.
Erdogan demanded a withdrawal of the Saudi forces from Bahrain, whereas Riyadhvisualized a prolonged military presence as the only guarantee against a Shi'ite takeover of power in Manama.
Faisal once lamented about his own legacy in a memorable interview with New York Times when he reportedly said:
But the unscheduled visit of a few hours late in the evening last Thursday to the Turkish capital of Ankara was a daunting mission to pin Turkey down to a favorable stance on the momentous developments in the region. Ankara, whose ties with Tehran dramatically improved in the recent past, had begun treading on the first circle of Saudi interests.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had just characterized the Saudi intervention in Bahrain as "a new Karbala". The reference was to the battle that took place in 680 between the forces of the Prophet Mohammad's grandson Husain ibn Ali and Umayyad caliph Yazid II.
Erdogan demanded a withdrawal of the Saudi forces from Bahrain, whereas Riyadhvisualized a prolonged military presence as the only guarantee against a Shi'ite takeover of power in Manama.
Faisal once lamented about his own legacy in a memorable interview with New York Times when he reportedly said:
We have not yet seen moments of joy in all that time [past 36 years] ... You see the amount of water, you think you can hold something in your hand, but it falls away. Sand is the same thing. So unless there is something to hold in your hand and to point to success and as an achievement, then you have done nothing.
Faisal might have wondered whether it was water or sand he was holding in his hand as his private jet took off Thursday night ferrying him back to his home in Jeddah. Actually, he was holding something more solid.
Erdogan has since back-tracked from his Karbala statement. Two days later, Turkey force-landed an Iranian aircraft en route to Syria and confiscated materials that breached United Nations sanctions on Tehran - rocket launchers, mortars, Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition. A Turkish Foreign Ministry statement said, "The plane was allowed to leave ... without the banned material." The point being stressed is an "incident" has occurred involving Tehran, and Turkish diplomatic practices are extremely sophisticated.
What emerges is that there has been a steady shift in the past week in the way in which the Turkish leadership is viewing the regional situation. Thus far, Turkey has done well by placing itself on the right side of history in the New Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood's tacit equations with the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces, the Brotherhood's co-option of Salafis and its surge as the only organized force in the society and the resounding victory of the constitutional referendum (which the Brotherhood robustly backed) - these are positive trends as far as Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is concerned as they provide a new Islamic ideological basis for closer Turkish-Egyptian relations.
The Arab awakening seems to hold the potential to advance Erdogan's ambitious drive to secure for Turkey what his detractors call a "neo-Ottoman" leadership role in the region.
Libya, therefore, poses a challenge for Erdogan. First, the international community's intervention in Libya sets a precedent. It is not lost on Ankara that there are stirrings of mass protest in next-door Syria. Besides, Ankara realizes that international intervention inLibya is creating a fait accompli that Turkey has no say in. Ankara began rationalizing that it is in Turkey's all-round interests to cut a role for itself in political terms in the international intervention in Libya rather than to stay aloof. Faisal's advice would have helped.
However, Turkey has to work for gaining such a role. Ankara was upset that it wasn't invited to the summit meeting in Paris on Monday to choreograph the political approach to the Western intervention in Libya. French President Nikolas Sarkozy was keen to highlight his lead role in the intervention in Libya and probably punctured Turkey's aspirations as a regional power in North Africa. Turkey reacted strongly by questioning the locus standi of the intervention and the ferocity of the French air strikes.
Following a crucial strategy session in Ankara on Monday night, Turkey concluded that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be the best antidote to Sarkozy's vanity fair; and if the alliance were to take a lead role in the operations, Turkey would also have its say. (All NATO decisions are taken by consensus and Turkey is a major member country.)
Turkey hopes to secure a role similar to what it has been playing in Afghanistan - participation in the International Security Assistance Force except in combat operations.Ankara also argues that like in Afghanistan, NATO operations ought to have a mandate from the UN Security Council. Finally, Turkey would want NATO operations to stay within the ambit of UN resolution 1973, which means enforcing a ceasefire, implementing a no-fly zone and rendering relief and humanitarian assistance.
Turkey has calibrated for developments on the ground creating a dynamic of their own. For example, the air strikes may fail to bring desired results in terms of Muammar Gaddafi losing control. Then what? A de facto division of Libya may ensue. This may turn out to be a long and difficult war and at some stage deployment of ground troops may become necessary. On the contrary, if Gaddafi gets ousted in the near term, who will assume power? To quoteSami Cohen, a veteran Turkish commentator wired to the establishment's thinking, "No one knows this. There is no prepared plan for it. It's just another indication of an open-ended period of uncertainty."
In sum, Turkish ambitions as a regional power - like Sarkozy's - are cruising without a compass. Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama spoke to Erdogan on Tuesday evening to ensure Turkish participation in any NATO operations. NATO officials have since revealed that Turkey will be one of the seven members of the alliance to participate in the naval operations to enforce the UN's arms embargo and that four Turkish frigates, one submarine and one reserve ship have been deployed. (Canada, Spain, UK, Greece, Italy and US contributed one frigate each so far.)
Thus, Turkey has moved into the tent, finally. Turkey has now been included in the "contact group" of NATO participating countries, which will meet in London on Tuesday to "take stock" of the implementation of resolution 1973 so far and to "take forward this work", according to a British foreign office statement.
Turkey may also have won a point by forcing France to concede that NATO be given a role in the planning and execution of the campaign. (But France has also dug in by insisting that the political leadership will lie with "contact group", which will also include representatives from the Arab League and African Union).
For all appearances, Turkey continues to ride a high horse. A columnist in the pro-government, Islamist-oriented daily Zaman, Abdulhamit Bilici wrote:
Erdogan has since back-tracked from his Karbala statement. Two days later, Turkey force-landed an Iranian aircraft en route to Syria and confiscated materials that breached United Nations sanctions on Tehran - rocket launchers, mortars, Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition. A Turkish Foreign Ministry statement said, "The plane was allowed to leave ... without the banned material." The point being stressed is an "incident" has occurred involving Tehran, and Turkish diplomatic practices are extremely sophisticated.
What emerges is that there has been a steady shift in the past week in the way in which the Turkish leadership is viewing the regional situation. Thus far, Turkey has done well by placing itself on the right side of history in the New Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood's tacit equations with the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces, the Brotherhood's co-option of Salafis and its surge as the only organized force in the society and the resounding victory of the constitutional referendum (which the Brotherhood robustly backed) - these are positive trends as far as Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is concerned as they provide a new Islamic ideological basis for closer Turkish-Egyptian relations.
The Arab awakening seems to hold the potential to advance Erdogan's ambitious drive to secure for Turkey what his detractors call a "neo-Ottoman" leadership role in the region.
Libya, therefore, poses a challenge for Erdogan. First, the international community's intervention in Libya sets a precedent. It is not lost on Ankara that there are stirrings of mass protest in next-door Syria. Besides, Ankara realizes that international intervention inLibya is creating a fait accompli that Turkey has no say in. Ankara began rationalizing that it is in Turkey's all-round interests to cut a role for itself in political terms in the international intervention in Libya rather than to stay aloof. Faisal's advice would have helped.
However, Turkey has to work for gaining such a role. Ankara was upset that it wasn't invited to the summit meeting in Paris on Monday to choreograph the political approach to the Western intervention in Libya. French President Nikolas Sarkozy was keen to highlight his lead role in the intervention in Libya and probably punctured Turkey's aspirations as a regional power in North Africa. Turkey reacted strongly by questioning the locus standi of the intervention and the ferocity of the French air strikes.
Following a crucial strategy session in Ankara on Monday night, Turkey concluded that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be the best antidote to Sarkozy's vanity fair; and if the alliance were to take a lead role in the operations, Turkey would also have its say. (All NATO decisions are taken by consensus and Turkey is a major member country.)
Turkey hopes to secure a role similar to what it has been playing in Afghanistan - participation in the International Security Assistance Force except in combat operations.Ankara also argues that like in Afghanistan, NATO operations ought to have a mandate from the UN Security Council. Finally, Turkey would want NATO operations to stay within the ambit of UN resolution 1973, which means enforcing a ceasefire, implementing a no-fly zone and rendering relief and humanitarian assistance.
Turkey has calibrated for developments on the ground creating a dynamic of their own. For example, the air strikes may fail to bring desired results in terms of Muammar Gaddafi losing control. Then what? A de facto division of Libya may ensue. This may turn out to be a long and difficult war and at some stage deployment of ground troops may become necessary. On the contrary, if Gaddafi gets ousted in the near term, who will assume power? To quoteSami Cohen, a veteran Turkish commentator wired to the establishment's thinking, "No one knows this. There is no prepared plan for it. It's just another indication of an open-ended period of uncertainty."
In sum, Turkish ambitions as a regional power - like Sarkozy's - are cruising without a compass. Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama spoke to Erdogan on Tuesday evening to ensure Turkish participation in any NATO operations. NATO officials have since revealed that Turkey will be one of the seven members of the alliance to participate in the naval operations to enforce the UN's arms embargo and that four Turkish frigates, one submarine and one reserve ship have been deployed. (Canada, Spain, UK, Greece, Italy and US contributed one frigate each so far.)
Thus, Turkey has moved into the tent, finally. Turkey has now been included in the "contact group" of NATO participating countries, which will meet in London on Tuesday to "take stock" of the implementation of resolution 1973 so far and to "take forward this work", according to a British foreign office statement.
Turkey may also have won a point by forcing France to concede that NATO be given a role in the planning and execution of the campaign. (But France has also dug in by insisting that the political leadership will lie with "contact group", which will also include representatives from the Arab League and African Union).
For all appearances, Turkey continues to ride a high horse. A columnist in the pro-government, Islamist-oriented daily Zaman, Abdulhamit Bilici wrote:
So, where does Turkey currently stand? Ankara is still behind the US resolution ... [But]Turkey is uneasy about the poor planning and one-sided nature of the operation. It is also upset with NATO secretary general Anders Fogh-Rasmussen's "we-decided-you-can-join-us" attitude ... It's unthinkable for a Turkish soldier to attack a Muslim country. But if it is included in the planning process properly, the Turkish military is ready to offer support in every platform, including NATO regarding non-combat issues. Let's see if the West will choose to help itself and the region by cooperating with Turkey or do the complete opposite by excluding Turkey.
However, in reality, Turkey has been compelled to rethink hard and fast. The "red line" was fast approaching and Turkey was punching beyond its weight. Faisal helped Ankara view matters from a realistic perspective. Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia over the weekend where the first signs began appearing in the Turkish rhetoric that a relentless process of rethink was commencing.
This seems to have been one mission at least where Faisal probably went wrong in his harsh self-appraisal during the New York Times interview an year ago that his legacy might be defined by "profound disappointment than by success".
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan,Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
This seems to have been one mission at least where Faisal probably went wrong in his harsh self-appraisal during the New York Times interview an year ago that his legacy might be defined by "profound disappointment than by success".
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan,Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Artículo No. 26 Libya overshadows missile defense at Gates’ Moscow talks Ria Novosti 24.3.11 RIA Novosti political commentator Dmitry Kosyrev
Immediately after a meeting in Moscow with his Russian counterpart, Anatoly Serdyukov, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made his sensational announcement that major combat operations over Libya will taper off markedly within the next few days. It is only a coincidence but certainly a happy one for Russia, which, as a permanent UN Security Council member, remains cautiously pessimistic about Western intervention in that North African country.
In last week’s vote, Moscow chose not to veto down Resolution 1973, authorizing military action against Libyan government targets – apparently in a gesture of solidarity with adjacent Arab countries behind this document. But it also abstained from voting in favor, unsure of the actual intentions of the U.S. and European allies keen to send in their warplanes.
Libya also dominated the agenda of Gates’ subsequent talks with President Dmitry Medvedev, which initially had been expected to focus on plans for a missile defense system in Europe.
The Russian leader suggested Moscow could act as a mediator between Muammar Gaddafi and Western governments.
According to the Kremlin press office, Medvedev expressed his concern over the no-fly zone as well as potential civilian casualties as a result of the U.S.-led coalition’s indiscriminate air strikes in Libya.
According to the Kremlin press office, Medvedev expressed his concern over the no-fly zone as well as potential civilian casualties as a result of the U.S.-led coalition’s indiscriminate air strikes in Libya.
The possibility of Moscow’s involvement in the military operation was not under discussion, presidential spokespeople say.
As for the ongoing debate over the planned European missile defense shield, the sides reportedly made no headway on that front. Medvedev just reiterated Moscow’s official stance, presented at last autumn’s Russian-NATO summit in Lisbon.
Moscow is pushing for a system that could protect the entire European continent against outside threats. ButWashington wants a national shield of its own, which could potentially be directed at Russian targets.
As for the ongoing debate over the planned European missile defense shield, the sides reportedly made no headway on that front. Medvedev just reiterated Moscow’s official stance, presented at last autumn’s Russian-NATO summit in Lisbon.
Moscow is pushing for a system that could protect the entire European continent against outside threats. ButWashington wants a national shield of its own, which could potentially be directed at Russian targets.
The military intervention in Libya leaves us wondering how the American public feels about the U.S.government having unleashed yet another overseas campaign “to spread democracy.”
Here is what Richard Cohen, a journalist who runs a weekly political column in The Washington Post, has to say on the issue:
“A day into the operation, the bedraggled chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, appeared everywhere but on Animal Planet to say that the operation he himself clearly did not favor might end with the man the president said he wanted gone — a certain Col. Gaddafi — still in power… Libya is — and ought to remain — a humanitarian mission, one that would have been better undertaken sooner rather than later by a unified administration that… could have made an argument for staying out or it could have made a more forceful argument for going in. Instead it made both.”
“A day into the operation, the bedraggled chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, appeared everywhere but on Animal Planet to say that the operation he himself clearly did not favor might end with the man the president said he wanted gone — a certain Col. Gaddafi — still in power… Libya is — and ought to remain — a humanitarian mission, one that would have been better undertaken sooner rather than later by a unified administration that… could have made an argument for staying out or it could have made a more forceful argument for going in. Instead it made both.”
And here is a comment from another Washington Post columnist, George Will:
“America’s war aim is inseparable from… destruction of that regime. So our purpose is to create a political vacuum, into which we hope… good things will spontaneously flow. But if Gaddafi cannot be beaten by the rebels, are we prepared to supply their military deficiencies? And if the decapitation of his regime produces what the removal of Saddam Hussein did — bloody chaos — what then are our responsibilities regarding the tribal vendettas we may have unleashed?”
“America’s war aim is inseparable from… destruction of that regime. So our purpose is to create a political vacuum, into which we hope… good things will spontaneously flow. But if Gaddafi cannot be beaten by the rebels, are we prepared to supply their military deficiencies? And if the decapitation of his regime produces what the removal of Saddam Hussein did — bloody chaos — what then are our responsibilities regarding the tribal vendettas we may have unleashed?”
Washington’s declared intention to scale down its military involvement in Libya deserves respect. But it remains to be seen whether this is a real curtailment or just a brief lull marking the end of the mission’s first leg.
No one expected that Gates’ farewell visit ahead of his resignation would make a significant contribution to the process of Russian-American rapprochement. It is only a part of the process, although the layout of our missile defense cooperation is a serious issue. The dialogue will continue, and it is possible that the lessons learned in Libya (when the operations end) will give both parties an opportunity for reassessment.
While in St. Petersburg, Gates urged Russia to consider possible models of involvement in international military coalitions. This seems somewhat curious against the backdrop of the current chaos in Libya in, especially light of the Pentagon chief’s announcement that this chaos will soon have to be brought to an end. Given the situation in Libya, what form could Russia’s involvement in such coalitions take in the future? There is ample food forthought.
Artículo No. 25 Saudi presence 'fuels' strife fears
| |
| The deployment of more than 1,000 Saudi troops to Bahrain could increase the Sunni-Shiadivide, analysts say. David Elkins and Aprille Muscara 15 Mar 2011 |
Al-Jazeera
Monday's arrival of more than 1000 Saudi and hundreds of Emirati security forces with a mandate from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to support King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa's regime in Sunni- ruled, Shia-majority Bahrain only stokes sectarian conflict and fuels the regional power politics between US-Saudi hegemony and an increasingly influential Shia-led Iran, analysts argue.
"Although it is clearly too early to know the outcome of this decision, or perhaps even the purpose - to crack down on the protesters? to intimidate the opposition into joining the national dialogue? - I will hazard to predict that the impact will be negative, even on the stability they hope to preserve," said Kristin Diwan, an expert on the Arab Gulf at the American University.
The highest-ranking member of Bahrain's Shia religious establishment, Sheik Isa Qassim, criticised al-Khalifa's claims that the mobilisation of GCC troops is a broader effort to ensure regional stability, rather than whatQassim considers to be Sunni entrenchment and a veiled challenge to Shia representation in the government.
"[T]he narrative of preserving order will be insufficient," Diwan said. "Sectarian tensions are already on the rise in the Gulf since the Iraq intervention, with Shia populations throughout the Gulf facing the rising influence of anti-Shia Salafi Islamist movements. Inflaming these communal tensions hardly qualifies as a recipe for stability."
The highest-ranking member of Bahrain's Shia religious establishment, Sheik Isa Qassim, criticised al-Khalifa's claims that the mobilisation of GCC troops is a broader effort to ensure regional stability, rather than whatQassim considers to be Sunni entrenchment and a veiled challenge to Shia representation in the government.
"[T]he narrative of preserving order will be insufficient," Diwan said. "Sectarian tensions are already on the rise in the Gulf since the Iraq intervention, with Shia populations throughout the Gulf facing the rising influence of anti-Shia Salafi Islamist movements. Inflaming these communal tensions hardly qualifies as a recipe for stability."
Iranian role
Ultimately, a dialogue that avoids answering Bahraini protesters' most significant demands – which include the formation of a genuinely representative government, an acceptable solution to public property and naturalisation disputes, and a concerted effort to mitigate sectarian conflicts – will only erode the already cascading "capacity and legitimacy" of the US to encourage changes similar to those witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia, observers say.
In a seemingly unmistakable rejection of al-Khalifa and the US's proposals, the main opposition party, al-Wefaq, has refused to participate in a national dialogue and, along with other opposition groups, denounced the arrival of the GCC troops as barefaced "occupation" and an affront to unarmed citizens in a statement on Monday.
"The presence of the foreign troops plays strongly into the hard-line opposition conviction that the al Khalifa-led government is illegitimate and cannot be trusted," Diwan noted. "Inviting foreign troops to put down protesting citizens only reinforces this view. The work of the seven- party opposition and especially al-Wefaq to bring the bulk of the opposition to the table just got harder."
The GCC mobilisation into Bahrain follows an unannounced visit by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates to the country Saturday, in which he urged the ruling family to enact sweeping reforms – not "baby steps" – to accommodate opposition protesters.
According to media reports, Gates warned the al-Khalifa government that, although there was no evidence thatIran inflamed the demonstrations in their country, continued unrest would provide fodder for exploitation by the Iranians.
Two days later, following a request by al-Khalifa, the GCC deployed troops to the island kingdom, which some observers see as a message for both Washington and Tehran to stay out of the Gulf's affairs and an expression of support for the besieged regime.
"Ironically, the decision by the al-Khalifa government may be opening the door for greater Iranian influence,"Diwan noted. "By inviting in external troops, the al-Khalifa just took the first step to broadening the conflict beyond the national context."
US response
"The presence of the foreign troops plays strongly into the hard-line opposition conviction that the al Khalifa-led government is illegitimate and cannot be trusted," Diwan noted. "Inviting foreign troops to put down protesting citizens only reinforces this view. The work of the seven- party opposition and especially al-Wefaq to bring the bulk of the opposition to the table just got harder."
The GCC mobilisation into Bahrain follows an unannounced visit by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates to the country Saturday, in which he urged the ruling family to enact sweeping reforms – not "baby steps" – to accommodate opposition protesters.
According to media reports, Gates warned the al-Khalifa government that, although there was no evidence thatIran inflamed the demonstrations in their country, continued unrest would provide fodder for exploitation by the Iranians.
Two days later, following a request by al-Khalifa, the GCC deployed troops to the island kingdom, which some observers see as a message for both Washington and Tehran to stay out of the Gulf's affairs and an expression of support for the besieged regime.
"Ironically, the decision by the al-Khalifa government may be opening the door for greater Iranian influence,"Diwan noted. "By inviting in external troops, the al-Khalifa just took the first step to broadening the conflict beyond the national context."
US response
While raising the prospect of Iranian involvement, the move could also signal an affront to USinfluence – both symptoms of a larger trend, observers note.
"Beyond the shift in the relative distribution of power among important regional actors, the very essence of power politics in Middle East is shifting from hard military power, where America has the advantage, to soft power, where the Islamic Republic [of Iran and] its allies have the advantage," Hillary Mann Leverett, a former US State Department and National Security Council official, argued at a conference here last week.
Although the US did not explicitly condone nor condemn the GCC's latest decision to sanction the deployment of its forces into the island kingdom, the Barack Obama administration has taken a cautious approach to the growing protests there so as not to undermine the opposition parties' demands or inadvertently strengthen Iran's ability, real or imagined, to leverage the opposition leaders of Bahrain's roughly 70 per cent Shia majority.
"We urge the government of Bahrain to pursue a peaceful and meaningful dialogue with the opposition rather than resorting to the use of force," White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said in a statement Sunday. "In particular, we urge our GCC partners…to act in a way that supports dialogue instead of undermining it."
Critics point out that the GCC mandate was designed to protect the council members from foreign invasion and not for intervening in a nation's domestic affairs.
"This is not an invasion of a country," Carney argued at a press conference Monday.
However, he stressed, "stability in the region will be brought about by dialogue and political reform and it is counterproductive to that goal to, in any way, repress the expression of those desires."
"Beyond the shift in the relative distribution of power among important regional actors, the very essence of power politics in Middle East is shifting from hard military power, where America has the advantage, to soft power, where the Islamic Republic [of Iran and] its allies have the advantage," Hillary Mann Leverett, a former US State Department and National Security Council official, argued at a conference here last week.
Although the US did not explicitly condone nor condemn the GCC's latest decision to sanction the deployment of its forces into the island kingdom, the Barack Obama administration has taken a cautious approach to the growing protests there so as not to undermine the opposition parties' demands or inadvertently strengthen Iran's ability, real or imagined, to leverage the opposition leaders of Bahrain's roughly 70 per cent Shia majority.
"We urge the government of Bahrain to pursue a peaceful and meaningful dialogue with the opposition rather than resorting to the use of force," White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said in a statement Sunday. "In particular, we urge our GCC partners…to act in a way that supports dialogue instead of undermining it."
Critics point out that the GCC mandate was designed to protect the council members from foreign invasion and not for intervening in a nation's domestic affairs.
"This is not an invasion of a country," Carney argued at a press conference Monday.
However, he stressed, "stability in the region will be brought about by dialogue and political reform and it is counterproductive to that goal to, in any way, repress the expression of those desires."
Suscribirse a:
Entradas (Atom)