Artículo No. 25 Saudi presence 'fuels' strife fears

The deployment of more than 1,000 Saudi troops to Bahrain could increase the Sunni-Shiadivide, analysts say. David Elkins and Aprille Muscara 15 Mar 2011

Al-Jazeera

Monday's arrival of more than 1000 Saudi and hundreds of Emirati security forces with a mandate from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to support King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa's regime in Sunni- ruled, Shia-majority Bahrain only stokes sectarian conflict and fuels the regional power politics between US-Saudi hegemony and an increasingly influential Shia-led Iran, analysts argue.

"Although it is clearly too early to know the outcome of this decision, or perhaps even the purpose - to crack down on the protesters? to intimidate the opposition into joining the national dialogue? - I will hazard to predict that the impact will be negative, even on the stability they hope to preserve," said Kristin Diwan, an expert on the Arab Gulf at the American University.

The highest-ranking member of Bahrain's Shia religious establishment, Sheik Isa Qassim, criticised al-Khalifa's claims that the mobilisation of GCC troops is a broader effort to ensure regional stability, rather than whatQassim considers to be Sunni entrenchment and a veiled challenge to Shia representation in the government.

"[T]he narrative of preserving order will be insufficient," Diwan said. "Sectarian tensions are already on the rise in the Gulf since the Iraq intervention, with Shia populations throughout the Gulf facing the rising influence of anti-Shia Salafi Islamist movements. Inflaming these communal tensions hardly qualifies as a recipe for stability."

Iranian role

Ultimately, a dialogue that avoids answering Bahraini protesters' most significant demands – which include the formation of a genuinely representative government, an acceptable solution to public property and naturalisation disputes, and a concerted effort to mitigate sectarian conflicts – will only erode the already cascading "capacity and legitimacy" of the US to encourage changes similar to those witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia, observers say.

In a seemingly unmistakable rejection of al-Khalifa and the US's proposals, the main opposition party, al-Wefaq, has refused to participate in a national dialogue and, along with other opposition groups, denounced the arrival of the GCC troops as barefaced "occupation" and an affront to unarmed citizens in a statement on Monday.

"The presence of the foreign troops plays strongly into the hard-line opposition conviction that the al Khalifa-led government is illegitimate and cannot be trusted," Diwan noted. "Inviting foreign troops to put down protesting citizens only reinforces this view. The work of the seven- party opposition and especially al-Wefaq to bring the bulk of the opposition to the table just got harder."

The GCC mobilisation into Bahrain follows an unannounced visit by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates to the country Saturday, in which he urged the ruling family to enact sweeping reforms – not "baby steps" – to accommodate opposition protesters.

According to media reports, Gates warned the al-Khalifa government that, although there was no evidence thatIran inflamed the demonstrations in their country, continued unrest would provide fodder for exploitation by the Iranians.

Two days later, following a request by al-Khalifa, the GCC deployed troops to the island kingdom, which some observers see as a message for both Washington and Tehran to stay out of the Gulf's affairs and an expression of support for the besieged regime.

"Ironically, the decision by the al-Khalifa government may be opening the door for greater Iranian influence,"Diwan noted. "By inviting in external troops, the al-Khalifa just took the first step to broadening the conflict beyond the national context."

US response

While raising the prospect of Iranian involvement, the move could also signal an affront to USinfluence – both symptoms of a larger trend, observers note.

"Beyond the shift in the relative distribution of power among important regional actors, the very essence of power politics in Middle East is shifting from hard military power, where America has the advantage, to soft power, where the Islamic Republic [of Iran and] its allies have the advantage," Hillary Mann Leverett, a former US State Department and National Security Council official, argued at a conference here last week.

Although the US did not explicitly condone nor condemn the GCC's latest decision to sanction the deployment of its forces into the island kingdom, the Barack Obama administration has taken a cautious approach to the growing protests there so as not to undermine the opposition parties' demands or inadvertently strengthen Iran's ability, real or imagined, to leverage the opposition leaders of Bahrain's roughly 70 per cent Shia majority.

"We urge the government of Bahrain to pursue a peaceful and meaningful dialogue with the opposition rather than resorting to the use of force," White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said in a statement Sunday. "In particular, we urge our GCC partners…to act in a way that supports dialogue instead of undermining it."

Critics point out that the GCC mandate was designed to protect the council members from foreign invasion and not for intervening in a nation's domestic affairs.

"This is not an invasion of a country," Carney argued at a press conference Monday.

However, he stressed, "stability in the region will be brought about by dialogue and political reform and it is counterproductive to that goal to, in any way, repress the expression of those desires." 

Artículo No. 24 Agenda: With George Friedman on Japan March 18, 2011 | Stratfor

STRATFOR CEO George Friedman examines the financial and strategic issues Japan faces, the future of the nuclear industry, and the prospects of Saudi Arabia increasing its oil output.

Colin: Japan seems devastated and vulnerable. Key nuclear plants are out of action, making it even more dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, where there’s much uncertainty. There’s a capital requirement of hundreds of billions of dollars in a country that is plagued with slow growth and debt. So what now for Japan, for nuclear power and for oil supplies?

Welcome to Agenda today with George Friedman. George, Japan is also America’s main ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaving aside humanitarian aid, what steps would you expect theUnited States to take in support of its friend at a time of devastation?

George: Well firstly, you used the word devastated. I think that’s a vast overstatement to what’s happened in Japan. It has had in the northeast a significant earthquake; it has caused damages other earthquakes do and more than most; certainly several nuclear plants have gone off-line and seem to be very dangerous at the moment. But devastated maybe something we can say the future; it is not something we can say now. And I think it’s really important to keep that in perspective. It’s a dangerous situation. It is an unprecedented situation, and it may devastate Japan. But at this point we haven’t had that. As for what the United States can do for Japan, the answer is relatively little. The United States has no more capability of dealing with these nuclear reactors than the Japanese does. The Japanese are superb engineers. They will have to deal their roads, their bridges that have been destroyed. These are all things that the Japanese have to do themselves. One of the questions of the Japanese will be food supplies. Will they be able to bring the food into the city depending on the condition of roadways and so on. And the United Statesmay be able to have some help there but I don’t think they really need it there. And this is really one of the important things: while we all focused on the effect of the nuclear plants, which is not trivial by any means, it’s quite significant. Remember Japan was shaken by a 9.0 earthquake and the really important question that we have to deal with is infrastructure. What’s happened to the bridges? What’s happened to the railroads? How long will it take to repair them? What’s happened to the food supply? What’s happened to storage bunkers? What are the ports like? These are the things we really have to ask about Japan in addition to the nuclear issue.

Colin: Japan now faces a shortfall in energy with the loss of significant nuclear power capacity, and in terms of oil, at least, is heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf.

George: The Japanese import virtually all raw materials they use in their industry. They import oil for example from the Persian Gulf, coal from Australia and other places. They have used nuclear power as their safety net, as the one thing that was under their control because they’ve been able to import enough uranium to back up what they need. The Japanese now have to face the fact of their vulnerability. Because in the Persian Gulf you have Bahrain exploding, you have unrest in several other countries. There is a reasonable question about how secure Japanese access is to the oil of the Persian Gulf. And they’ve lost the certainty of their backup system, their nuclear power. They’ve lost certainty of having all of it. They’ve also raised some questions about its safety. This has had a psychic impact on the Japanese, increasing their sense of vulnerability in this world they haven’t had for a while. And so I think they will be able to handle the physical shortfalls somewhat better than they’re going to handle the psychic shortfalls. In other words, they are going to have been sometime reconsidering just how safe they are in this world.

Colin: We know the Japanese are a resolute people. The old Japanese proverb: Fall down seven times and get up eight. They’ll recover, but rebuilding the infrastructure will be a hugecost, and this for an economy that is fairly stagnant and riddled with debt.

George: The Japanese is an extraordinarily wealthy nation. Their net worth is out of sight. The idea of Japan needing to get aid from foreign countries in terms of financials is fairly far-fetched. Certainly they have a debt problem, but you know that debt problem is an endemic one and a long-term one. They have a problem of repairing their infrastructure. It’ll cost something; they’ll pay for it. No matter what the cost is, they’re going to bear it, whether they bear it by increased taxes, printing more money, borrowing on international markets. But they’re certainly are not going to be in the position that they’re going to be needingforeign aid anytime soon.

Colin: The critics of nuclear have had a field day. But almost as noisy have been its devotees, who don’t seem to think that the events of the last week are much of a deterrent to a continued expansion of this so-called clean form of energy.

George: Here are the facts. The countries that have built nuclear power plants are not going to be able to shut them down because they can’t. If they shut them down en masse, particularly countries like France, they’re going to have a terrific shortfall of energy, and their economic devastation is going to be substantial. So the idea that we’re going to shut down our nuclear power plants is just not going to happen. We may shut down some in some particularly vulnerable position in earthquakes, but that’ll be from political reasons.

The thing to understand about this entire thing of course is how many people are in nuclear power. And how the first issue is, in the United States for example, there is some inCalifornia and nuclear faults, and the discussion is shutting it down. Because in the end, the extreme critics of it are not simply saying that we should not build any more their same. They’re saying we should shut down the ones we have. That’s not going to happen. As for those who say that this should have no impact on plants we’re building, that’s also not going to happen from a political point of view. Whatever the engineering, whatever the principles, politically it’s going to become extremely difficult to make the case that we should base a strategy of energy independence from fossil fuels primarily on nuclear. It’s going to be very difficult. People are not going to want to have it built near them. This is a reminder that this could fail and it’s certainly true that no one has died yet from it. It’s also certainly true that other forms of energy are more dangerous in some ways, and it’s also certainly true that all that doesn’t matter. The psychological structure we have right now is going to do two things. We’re not going to be shutting down a lot of power plants. It’s going to be very difficult to get them approved. The political process has now shifted as it shifted afterChernobyl.

Colin: With oil prices up, and oil in demand, the Saudis hold the key. They could pump more oil. Will they?

George: There’s no question that they’re under pressure to pump more oil, they have to. Their primary tool in maintaining social stability is spreading cash around, making sure that everybody is satisfied with the royal family and with the government. To do that they need to pump more oil. So do the other oil-rich states that have had instability. The real question, however, is not whether the Saudis want to pump oil; the real question is going to be whether the Iranians will give them the breathing room to do so, or will they block the straits of Hormuz, or do something else that’s unpredictable at this time. We’re in a showdown between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and that is a serious problem. Oddly in the same time the Japanese are dealing with their nuclear meltdown, their fear is a political meltdown in thePersian Gulf that they can’t control.

Colin: George Friedman, thank you. And that’s Agenda for this week. Thanks for taking thetime to watch.

Artículo No. 23 Egyptian Involvement in Libya March 18, 2011 | Stratfor Egyptian soldiers give food and water to Libyan refugees in Sallumon March 17 Summary

With its succession crisis resolved, Egypt has taken great interest in the Libya crisis. Egypt has historically exerted strong influence in eastern Libya and is looking to use the current crisis to restore that position. Even if Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi cannot be removed from power, a de facto split in Libya would allow Egypt to fill the resulting void in the east. Analysis STRATFOR reported in late February, early in the Libya crisis, that Egyptian army and special operations forces units were quietly providing weaponry and training to Libyan opposition forces while attempting to organize a political command in the east. In addition, Egypt has been funneling food and medical supplies to the rebel forces. Unnamed senior U.S. officials acknowledged the Egyptian support in a March 18 Wall Street Journal report, saying, “There’s no formal U.S. policy or acknowledgment that this is going on” but “this is something we have knowledge of.” A STRATFOR Qatari diplomatic source has meanwhile claimed thatEgypt is not contributing its bases to the impending NATO-led intervention in Libya. Egypt’s interest in a post-Gadhafi regime is based on the following factors: ·                       Preventing a refugee crisis. Egypt is the logical country for eastern Libyan refugees to flee to in the event of an invasion from the west by Gadhafi’s forces. More than 3,000 Libyan migrants have reportedly made their way to the Sallum border crossing with Egypt and remain in refugee camps there. Aid workers estimate that some 40,000 to 100,000 Libyan refugees could rush to Egypt should Gadhafi take the rebel-held city ofBenghazi. Egypt is attempting to resuscitate its economy following its own political turmoil and has an interest in containing any fallout from Libya that could increase the burden on the Egyptian state. ·                       Labor market. Libya is a significant market for Egyptian laborers who cannot find work in their own country. The Egyptian Labor Ministry estimates around 1.5 million Egyptians live and work in Libya and send an estimated $254 million in remittances back home every year. The Gadhafi regime has placed heavy restrictions on foreign workers in Libya in recent years, and the Egyptian government is hoping that a post-Gadhafi government will be more willing and able to absorb its workers. ·                       Security concerns. Libya’s eastern region is a traditional stronghold for radical Islamists, including the al Qaeda-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Though the Gadhafi regime has been largely effective in containing the jihadist threat in Libya, the current chaos opens the door for a jihadist resurgence.Egypt’s military-led regime is already on alert for the threat of Islamist militancy spillover from Gaza and has a growing interest in keeping close tabs on jihadist activity in easternLibya. ·                       Energy assets. Current oil production in Libya is concentrated in the east, though much of that production has been taken offline by the fighting and by staff shortages at energy facilities. Egypt has a strong economic interest in gaining direct or indirect access to these energy assets for its own internal wealth should the opportunity arise. ·                       Regional influence. Having resolved it succession crisis by ousting President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian military-led regime is reasserting Egypt’s role in the Arab world. It has facilitated talks between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian territories, reached out to Syria and coordinated with the Saudis on Iran. In North Africa, Egypt is positioning itself to be the go-to Arab power for the Europeans, who have already taken agamble on Gadhafi’s ouster and may be committing themselves to a military intervention with an elusive outcome in the hopes of retaining their energy investments in the country. Egypt has historically exerted strong influence in the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica and is looking to use the current crisis to restore that position. STRATFOR’s Egyptian diplomatic sources have insisted over the past couple of weeks that the Egyptian military has been ready to intervene in Libya but has been held back by the United States. It is unclear if Egypt had the logistical capability for a deep military thrust into Libya, or if it ever seriously intended to intervene in the first place. Nonetheless,Egypt benefits greatly from appearing to be willing to defend the Libyan people against Gadhafi’s regime while distancing itself from any military intervention led by the region’s former colonial powers in Europe. Not every power in the region would be happy to see Egyptexpand its influence in Libya. Three Arab League countries —Algeria, Syria and Yemen — voted against the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya while Egypt led the call for action. Each of these countries, especially Yemen and its embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh, fears the precedent that would be set for their own regimes should Gadhafi be forced from office. Algeria andSyria are watching Egypt’s revival in the region with particular concern. In late 1977, months after Algeria hastily negotiated a cease-fire to end a border skirmish between Egypt and Libyabefore Egyptian troops could advance further into eastern Libya, then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat broke off relations withAlgeria, Syria and South Yemen. These were the three countries that most strongly opposed Sadat’s early outreach to Israel and feared what an Egypt unrestrained by Israel would do. Egyptian support for Libyan rebels appears to be limited thus far to armor, training, food and medical supplies. STRATFOR also has received unconfirmed reports that some Egyptian soldiers are fighting alongside Libya’s poor-performing rebel forces. There are no signs yet of Egyptian troops massing on the border with Libya, but it remains a possibility as the crisis escalates. Even if the ouster of Gadhafi is not possible — so far it is doubtful that an air campaign alone will suffice to remove him from power — a de facto split between western and eastern Libya provides Egyptwith an opportunity to reassume an influential position inCyrenaica.

Artículo No. 22 Russia's Focus on Southern Kyrgyzstan March 18, 2011 | Stratfor

Summary

A recent uptick in diplomatic activity in southern Kyrgyzstan indicates Russia’s rising presence and influence in the country, which gives Russia substantial leverage over regional powers like Uzbekistan and global players like the United States. Russian plans to build a military training center in the volatile Kyrgyz south, ostensibly to fight terrorism, will also work to advance Moscow’s numerous strategic interests in the region.

Analysis

Kyrgyz Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev traveled to Moscow from March 17 to March 18 to meet with Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials. The Kyrgyz premier’s visit comes amid a high level of diplomatic activity in southern Kyrgyzstan. This includes the March 13-14 visit of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha; the March 16 visit of Viktor Ivanov, director of the Russian Federal Service for Drug Control; and the March 15 announcement by Kyrgyz President RozaOtunbayeva that two military training centers — one Russian and the other U.S.-funded — will be built in southern Kyrgyzstan.

This recent uptick in activity is indicative of Russia’s rising presence and influence in the country, which gives Russia substantial leverage over regional powers like Uzbekistan and global players like the United States. However, Russia knows it must maneuver carefully in southern Kyrgyzstan, which is a strategic yet volatile area and is a key factor in the stability of the Central Asian region as a whole.

Kyrgyzstan has been in a fragile state since the April 2010 revolution and the ensuing ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the southern regions of Osh and Jalal-Abad in June. There is no shortage of problems in the country, including porous borders with neighboringTajikistan and Uzbekistan and the flow of drugs, with Kyrgyzstan serving as part of a key narcotic transit route from Afghanistan to markets in Russia and Western Europe.

These are issues in which Russia is directly involved, and Russian and Kyrgyz officials discussed both this past week. Bordyuzha toured the borders, inspected border troops atBatken and Osh oblasts and met with Kyrgyz Security Council Secretary Shamil Atakhanovin Osh to discuss regional security. Then, two days later, Russian Federal Service for Drug Control director Ivanov visited Kyrgyzstan and pledged millions of dollars to combat drug trafficking, stating, “drug barons have participated directly in destabilizing the situation inKyrgyzstan.”

However, the most important problem in the country following the 2010 uprising iscontinuing levels of violence within Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the south. This could explainOtunbayeva’s March 15 announcement that two new military training facilities will be built in southern Kyrgyzstan. Otunbayeva said Russia would build a facility in the city of Osh, while the United States could fund construction of a facility in Batken oblast, in either the town ofKyzyl-Kiya or the town of Batken.

While there are still many details to be ironed out — such as when construction would begin or how directly the Russian military will be involved in manning and operating the baseRussia builds (the U.S. facility will be garrisoned by Kyrgyz troops only) — Otunbayeva made the purpose of these facilities clear. She said the growing threat from Islamist militants wasthe real problem in terms of regional security and the reason such bases were needed, adding, “We must be trained on how to fight terrorism.”

But the purpose of these new training facilities may be more than just preventing terrorism-related violence, of which there has been dubious evidence. The bases are also meant to prevent the migration of militants across borders and to contain the regional power next door, Uzbekistan. As events in Kyrgyzstan have unfolded since the 2010 revolution, this situation has had a direct impact on Uzbekistan. Southern Kyrgyzstan, which is located in the dynamic and ethnically diverse Fergana Valley, has a substantial population of ethnic Uzbeks. Tashkent has voiced its concern over the discrimination of ethnic Uzbeks inKyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan went as far as seriously considering military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan during the June outbreak of ethnic violence, which reportedly left hundreds of Uzbeks dead and displaced many more.

Uzbekistan is also looking with a cautious eye at Tajikistan, which has faced its own security problems since a high-profile jailbreak in August and has traditionally had grievances with Dushanbe, where it labels opposition elements “transnational Islamic terrorists.” Such elements have posed problems in the Rasht Valley that Uzbekistan fears could spread elsewhere in the region. Uzbekistan is worried about militants transiting not only from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan but also through Kyrgyzstan, so Tashkent is having to sharpen its focus on both neighbors as well as on internal security along the borders. All of these reasons could force Uzbekistan to be more assertive — and possibly take direct action — in a region in which Russia maintains hegemony and does not want any challengers.

With these factors and the vulnerability of the region in mind, Russia has been increasing its involvement in and strengthening ties to Kyrgyzstan, the weakest state in the region. And with its growing presence, Russia is hoping to prevent the security situation in the country from spiraling out of control and allowing the spread of Uzbekistan’s influence. Also, the announcement of building both facilities is another sign of cooperation between Russia and the United States. This region is key to the war in Afghanistan in terms of bases, fuel supply and logistics, and it is currently in Russia’s interest to be a cooperative partner with the West over this issue in order to gain leverage.

Therefore, these new facilities are not just about combating terrorism but also about advancing Russia’s numerous strategic interests in the region. However, Kyrgyzstan — and especially its volatile south — remains a potential problem for the stability of the region.Russia will therefore have to maneuver carefully to boost its presence and influence while preventing the region from coming to a boil.

Artículo No.21 The Obama doctrine: The limits to American power Mark Mardell | 20:52 UK time, Friday, 18 March 2011

There was a recurring rhythm to President Barack Obama's speech about the no-fly zone over Libya. But it wasn't a drum beat of war - it was a chorus about consensus, an insistence on internationalism.

Sure, there was an ultimatum, the threat of military action. Those are the headlines. And there was an explanation why America might have to fight.

Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Gaddafi would commit atrocities against his people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis would ensue. The entire region could be destabilised, endangering many of our allies and partners. The calls of the Libyan people for help would go unanswered. The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun. Moreover, the words of the international community would be rendered hollow.

But the subtext is more important. Read the last sentence in that quotation again. In a speech of just over three pages he repeats this point. Not once:

The US has worked with our allies and partners to shape a strong international response.

Not twice:

The US is prepared to act as part of an international coalition. American leadership is essential, but that does not mean acting alone.

Not three times:

It is not an action that we will pursue alone. Indeed, our British and French allies, and members of the Arab League, have already committed to take a leadership role.

But more:

So I have taken this decision with the confidence that action is necessary, and that we will not be acting alone.

So you might have gathered, the US is not going it alone. Throughout his declaration MrObama makes it clear how different this is to the Iraq war. Not only the international consensus, but the limits on action.

I also want to be clear about what we will not be doing. The US is not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal -- specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya.

The limits he sets out are not just practical, they are limits to ambitions and objectives.

I want to be clear: The change in the region will not and cannot be imposed by the US or any foreign power; ultimately, it will be driven by the people of the Arab World. It is their right and their responsibility to determine their own destiny.

Mr Obama is only a reluctant convert to action, and you could argue he's merely disguising his feet-dragging with noble rhetoric about the international community. It's certainly noticeable that he didn't mention the killings in Yemen (although he earlier issued a statement condemning them) or the unrest in Bahrain, stiffer tests of American power and resolve.

But I think we are seeing something new. He is using a crisis thrust upon him to set out anObama doctrine of sorts, to make a statement about America's relationship with the world. While he is in charge, he is saying, America will not go it alone, will set limits on what it does, and won't impose its will. Some will not like this,
and the world will find it difficult to adapt to a president who almost seems determined to lead from behind.

The Obama doctrine is a tightrope walk: Acting, but within limits, leading only as a first among equals.

Artículo No. 20 The Syrian Crackdown Continues March 19, 2011 |

Summary

The Syrian government continued a crackdown on protesters March 19 a day after rare post-Friday prayer demonstrations. Syria exhibits many of the symptoms other embattled regimes have experienced in the region, but the protests have not yet reached critical mass such that the regime would be in serious jeopardy. Damascus will rely on the country’s endemic regionalism and the regime’s pervasive security and intelligence apparatus in an effort to keep a lid on unrest. The Syrian regime also benefits from having a number of external allies and even adversaries who prefer the status quo in Damascus to regime change.

Analysis

Related Special Topic Page

·                       Middle East Unrest: Full Coverage

Syrian security forces continued a crackdown March 19 in the southern city of Daraa, a day after some thousands of protesters engaged in a rare demonstration calling for freedom and an end to the Syrian regime’s corruption and repression. Tear gas was fired on a funeral procession in Daraa, and fresh calls for protests in the city of Homs emerged on Facebook. Following Friday prayers March 18, demonstrations were held in Damascus, as well as Daraain the south, Banyas on the Mediterranean, and Homs north of Damascus and about 40 kilometers from Hama, the main bastion of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The mosques served as the main rallying point for the demonstrations, with the largest turnout of roughly 5,000 reported in Daraa. Demonstrations in Banyas, Damascus and Homs numbered in the several hundreds.

Though the protests have not come close to posing an existential threat to the regime, should significant disturbances take place in Hama, Aleppo and Homs, the Syrian regime will have a much bigger problem.

Opposition groups inside and outside Syria have attempted to capitalize on the North African unrest and mobilize protesters in Syria via Facebook over the past several weeks, having little success until March 18. The first Syrian “Day of Rage” protests Feb. 4-5 in the cities of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Qamishli rapidly fell flat under pressure from security forces. Follow-on attempts at demonstrations, this time less politically charged, were made Feb. 17 when some 500 protesters gathered in Damascus following a minor clash between a policeman and a civilian.

On Feb. 23, some 200 protesters gathered outside the Libyan Embassy in Damascus to express their solidarity with the Libyan people, prompting another crackdown by security forces. By the week of March 13, the protests began picking up momentum, with small demonstrations starting up in the Kurdish towns of al Qamishli and al Hasakah spreading toDamascus on March 15 and 16 with a few hundred protesters outside the Interior Ministry. On March 18, dubbed the “Day of Dignity,” the post-Friday prayer protests spread across the country and were met with a violent crackdown that reportedly left five demonstrators dead and hundreds injured.

According to a STRATFOR source, the Syrian authorities were anticipating demonstrations to initiate at al Umari mosque in Damascus and were prepared to confront the demonstrations. However, the Syrian authorities did not anticipate significant demonstrations breaking out elsewhere, particularly in the city of Daraa. The Syrian army reportedly has been put on alert following the March 18 protests and the use of plainclothes army troops to quell further disturbances is likely.

Syria exhibits many of the symptoms other embattled regimes have experienced in the region, including high unemployment, near-stagnant economic growth and a lack of civil society. Its hereditary regime’s members belong to a different branch of Islam than the majority of the population. (An Alawite sect considered heretical by many within the country’s Sunni majority rules Syria.) The Syrian regime relied on the country’s endemic regionalism and iron-fist tactics to avoid falling victim to the regional unrest. Unlike North Africa’s relative homogeneity, Syria’s population is split religiously, ethnically and culturally among Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Kurds, Druze and Christians.

The biggest opposition threat to the Alawite-Baathist regime comes from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), whose estimated 600,000 members mainly reside in the cities ofDamascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama. Since unrest in Syria began simmering in late January, the Syrian MB has taken a cautious approach toward calls for demonstrations by the mostly youth activists attempting to mobilize on Facebook. The 1982 massacre on the Syrian MB in their stronghold in Hama, following a Sunni uprising against the Alawite regime, remains fresh in the minds of many Syrian MB members, who are well aware that Syrian authorities can bring massive force to bear in putting down these protests. So far, the protests in Syriahave not come close to reaching any sort of critical mass capable of seriously threatening the regime. However, should significant disturbances take place in Hama, Aleppo and Homs, indicating greater MB participation in the current unrest, the Syrian regime will have a much more serious crisis on its hands.

While attempting to manage disturbances internally, the Syrian government benefits from having a number of external allies and even adversaries who prefer the status quo inDamascus to regime change. Iran, for example, has a strategic interest in maintaining close ties to the Alawite leadership in Syria to preserve its foothold in the Levant region. The more vulnerable Syria is internally, the more leverage Iran has in managing its relationship withDamascus by offering assistance where needed to clamp down on protests. To Syria’s west, Egypt — as a pivotal player in the Arab world now reasserting itself in the region after sorting out a succession crisis — has an interest in shoring up its relationship with Damascus to pull Syria into the Arab orbit and away from Iran. Egypt is also looking to Syriato facilitate talks between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian territories and has been reaching out to the Syrian regime recently toward this end. Meanwhile, Israel, while in an adversarial relationship with Syria, prefers the predictability of the al Assad regime to a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence in Syria.

Though the interests of these external players alone are not enough to prevent an internal crisis in Syria, the Syrian regime intends to rely on heavy-handed crackdowns by its pervasive security and intelligence apparatus to keep a lid on the current unrest. The Syrian regime has reason to be concerned, especially should its psychological wall of fear continue to erode and fail to deter protesters from swelling in the streets, but such a crisis is not yet assured.

Artículo No. 19 Russia Rises Amid Geopolitical Events STRATFOR

The first three months of 2011 have had a steady flow of geopolitically relevant events. A youth named Mohamed Bouazizi, protesting corruption and government harassment inTunisia, set more than himself alight on Dec. 17: He set an entire region on fire. Soon after, Tunisia and Egypt saw their long-time rulers fall. Libya essentially descended into civil war, and exit is uncertain. On Monday, almost exactly three months after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council’s forces entered the tiny island nation of Bahrain to prevent Iran from exploiting the anti-government protests there. The region’s unrest continues with almost daily action in North Africa and the Middle East. Around the globe, the March 11 Japan Tohoku earthquake rocked the world’s third largest economy and has caused the most serious nuclear accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
Among all this global consternation, Russia is the one power that has the luxury to take stock of it all in relative comfort. Russia has no reason to fear Middle East-style revolutionary activity. Its leadership is genuinely popular at home and safe from populist uprisings, at least for the time being. Russia is not embroiled in any war in the Middle East — unlike the United States, which is involved in two wars and trying hard to avoid a third one in Libya. Russia fears no migration exodus of North African refugees on its borders, as do the Europeans. Even the nuclear accident in Japan seems to be without negative effect for Russia, as the prevailing winds are blowing the radiation toward the Pacific Ocean and away from Russia’s eastern city of Vladivostok.

“Among all this global consternation, Russia is the one power that has the luxury to take stock of it all in relative comfort.”

In fact, Russia may be the one country that stands to gain from the various calamities in 2011. First, the general unrest in the Middle East has increased the price of oil by 18.5 percent. As the second largest oil exporter — and one not bound by OPEC production quotas — the increase in price goes directly into the Kremlin’s swelling coffers and is a welcome addition after the severe economic recession in 2009. Second, the Libyan unrest has cut off the 11 billion cubic-meter natural gas (bcm) Greenstream pipeline to Italy, causingEurope’s third largest consumer of natural gas to turn to Russia to make up the difference. Similarly, Japan’s nuclear imbroglio has forced Tokyo to turn to Russian emergency shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to fuel its natural gas-burning power plants.
But the most beneficial of all events for Russia may be the psychological effect that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant crisis is having on Western Europe. Germany’s government announced on Tuesday that it would close seven nuclear reactors during a three-month period, reassessing the future of Germany’s nuclear power industry. A looming Italian referendum on the government’s decision to unfreeze nuclear reactor construction now seems all but guaranteed to fail. Criticism of nuclear power has swept throughout the Continent with the European Union energy ministers deciding on Tuesday to subject the bloc’s nuclear reactors to a number of stress tests.
Europe’s hydropower capabilities are at capacity, while coal-burning power plants are perceived as incompatible with the bloc’s drive to reduce greenhouse emissions. The only alternatives left are renewable energy, which is slowly inching up in terms of overall electricity generation; nuclear power; and natural gas, which is seen as the much cleaner fossil fuel option to coal and oil. With fears about nuclear power returning to the Continent, it seems natural gas will be favored to fill the gap until renewable energy can become a larger part of the electricity generating mix.
As the world’s number one exporter of natural gas — and with the world’s largest reserves — this is very welcome news for the Kremlin. But for Russia, natural gas exports are about a lot more than just added revenue. For Russia, the natural gas exports are about control and political influence. LuringWestern Europe toward greater energy dependency on Russia is ultimately about wrestling the region away from its post-WWII alliance with the United States. As the Middle East and North Africa continue to wrestle with unrest — again reminding Europe of the region’s political uncertainty and fallibility as an energy exporter — and as Europe’s populations are reminded of their fears of nuclear power, Moscow is taking stock of it all.
But Moscow is also interested in how the crises around the world are politically beneficial outside of the energy realm. First, the devastation in Japan has allowed Moscow and Tokyo to have a rare conversation about cooperation after years (if not more) of declining relations over an island dispute. Russia is magnanimously trying to show that it isn’t such a bad neighbor to have, and is sending some of the larger amounts of aid, energy and rescue assistance.
The crises could also give Russia something it holds very precious — time. One of the reasons Russia grew so strong over the past decade is that its rival, the United States, was focused elsewhere. Moscow has been growing nervous in the past year knowing that Washington is starting to wrap up its commitments in the Middle East and South Asia. There is a discussion now rumbling through the Kremlin whether the events in the Middle East may keep the United States focused there a while longer, giving Russia even more time to cement its nearly dominant position in Eurasia. Thus far, the Kremlin must be satisfied with what the first three months of 2011 have brought in terms of its own strategic interests.